You may either win your peace or buy it: win it, by resistance to evil; buy it, by compromise with evil. – John Ruskin
FOR DR. MOHAMED AHMED EISA,
Former director of the Amal Center for the Treatment and Rehabilitation of Survivors of Torture (Nyala, South Darfur): there could be no finer human embodiment of courage, intelligence, and strength

and

FOR “AHMED” OF KASSAB CAMP (DIED SEPTEMBER 2010)
This is plenty. This is more than enough.
– Geoffrey Hill, “September Song”
Compromising with Evil: An archival history of Sudan, 2007 – 2012

COMMENTARY

“What distinguishes the writings of Professor Eric Reeves is not only consistency but also the creative marriage of high intellectual research with strict, unshakeable moral commitment to democracy and human values.”

Alhag Ali Warrag, editor-in-chief of al-Hurriyat (Khartoum/Kampala) and 2012 recipient of the Oxfam/PEN Award, given to writers and journalists defending freedom of expression.

“No one has written about the recent history of the Sudan with greater moral force, intellectual integrity, empirical knowledge, and political insight than Eric Reeves. This is an eBook that should be available on every political website.”

Michael Walzer, Institute for Advanced Study (Princeton, New Jersey), editor of Dissent Magazine and author of Just and Unjust Wars.

“Professor Eric Reeves has managed in this book to provide one of the most outstanding and meticulous archival accounts of this critical period in the history of the Greater Sudan.”

Luka Biong Deng Kuol, co-chair of the Abyei Oversight Committee and former Minister for Presidential Affairs in the Government of South Sudan.

“Many of those who have claimed to steadfastly stand by the victims of mass atrocities in Sudan have compromised their position and, perhaps out of fatigue, ignorance, or bewilderment, walked away. Eric Reeves is the exception. He has resisted the fickle throes of the day and maintained an intense and unparalleled focus on the greater tragedy: the deliberate and unremitting strategy of mass murder and starvation perpetuated by the Khartoum regime against the inhabitants of the greater Sudan. This work is a testament to this effort.

It provides an uncompromising and powerful resource detailing the last five torturous years in Sudan, from the failure of the international community in Darfur, and the border regions of Abyei and South Kordofan, to the impending war with the newly independent state of South Sudan. The contents of this work provide the empirical basis for renewed and increasing efforts to stop the atrocities in Sudan, or
at very least a historical record to guard against claims that we simply did not know what was happening.”

Lt.-General the Hon. Roméo A. Dallaire (retired), Member of Canadian Senate. Commander, UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR); his book *Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda*, was awarded the Governor General’s Literary Award for Non-Fiction (Canada) in 2004.

“For nearly 14 years, Eric Reeves has been by far the most consistent analyst of what is now two Sudans. Published in some of the more accessible outlets, on his blog and distributed through his email list or presented in testimonies in the United States Congress, his accounts of the humanitarian situation in Darfur, the genocide in the Nuba Mountains, the flagrant violations of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement by Khartoum, and the ongoing crises on the border between Sudan and South Sudan, have all been made more relevant to decisions made by the international community on Sudan than any other material that I am aware of. That this eBook brings most of these analyses together, with appendices and clear references, makes Reeves’s work more application-oriented than ever. The human rights activist, the humanitarian aid worker who needs to understand the context, the peace activist and the mediator between the two Sudans, should all have *Compromising with Evil* as a guide book.”

Jok Madut Jok, Professor of History at Loyola Marymount (Los Angeles) and author of *War and Slavery in Sudan*. He is founder and executive director of the Marol School (Warrap State, South Sudan) and Undersecretary for the Ministry of Culture, Government of South Sudan.

“Eric Reeves has made an invaluable contribution to international advocacy on Sudan. He brings the rigour of an academic to the conversation, but he writes with the passion of his heart. He has a deep sense of what is right and just, and this drives him to document and analyse the wrong he sees in Sudan. His contribution to the struggle for justice and freedom in both Sudan and South Sudan has been (and still is) invaluable, and is much appreciated by the people of both nations.”

John Ashworth, former advisor to the Sudan Ecumenical Forum who has worked for thirty years in the cause of a just peace for South Sudan.

“Eric Reeves is the Government of Sudan’s most engaged and informed critic. Other analysts falter in the face of the grim complexity of events in Darfur and Kordofan and South Sudan. But Reeves’s unrelenting attention has produced a devastating catalogue of the Government’s continuing abuse of its citizens—and the
inadequate response of the UN and the world powers. The rulers of Sudan have presided over an enormity of suffering; this book presents the case they have to answer.”

**John Ryle**, Legrand Ramsey Professor of Anthropology Bard College and author, *Warriors of the White Nile*.

“A must read. Eric Reeves writes about the hopelessness, the betrayal, the neglect, and the suffering of the Sudanese people. This is an important reminder of our failure to help end the suffering of the people of Sudan. In describing the Khartoum regime, our friend the late John Garang once said, ‘They are too deformed to be reformed.’ Eric brilliantly proves the case.”

**Ted Dagne**, Former Congressional aide and senior Africa researcher at the Congressional Research Service, Washington, DC.

“Eric Reeves is a ‘one hundred percent’ kind of guy when it comes to working to protect all the diverse victim populations of Omer Bashir and his National Islamic Front cabal in Khartoum. Eric, in good health and even when his life has been at risk, consistently has given his all on behalf of the folks Bashir has targeted for extinction for 23 years. Eric’s weapons are words, facts and principles. He does all he can to tell the victims’ and would-be victims’ stories and to document the criminal actions of the Bashir forces and strip them morally naked. This publication is another tool to do just that.”

**Roger Winter**, former Executive Director of the US Committee for Refugees, and former U.S. Special Representative on Sudan.

“Eric Reeves has been writing about contemporary Sudanese issues for over a decade, documenting on a regular basis that country’s slide into deeper violence and the successive failures of its peace processes. A professor of English Language and Literature at a well-known American liberal arts college, he was an unlikely candidate to become what some now call ‘a one-man lobbying machine.’ He has built up an impressive network of contacts, informants and partners in reporting the tragedy that has become Sudan, the evaporation of any realistic prospect for a democratic transformation in that country, and the inadequacies of the international community’s diplomatic interventions. This sequel to his 2007 archival account, *A Long Day’s Dying: Critical Moments in the Darfur Genocide*, is a timely reminder of how extensive his coverage has been not only of the Darfur crisis, but of the unraveling of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement and renewed fighting within Sudan’s ‘New South’: the SudanSouth Sudan frontier. It makes for very uncomfort-
able reading, and we are fortunate that, rather than give up in despair, Eric Reeves has persevered.”

**Douglas H. Johnson**, Oxford University, author of *The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars: Peace or Truce* (revised ed. 2011); former member of the Abyei Boundaries Commission and author of “The Road Back from Abyei” (Rift Valley Institute).

“Eric Reeves is the unparalleled voice of conscience and substance on the genocidal dimensions of the conflict in Darfur and Sudan. His cumulative knowledge and informed advocacy is ceaseless, and unsurpassed. This remarkable book is a key to understanding how change can happen in this unconscionably neglected part of the world.”

**John Hagan**, MacArthur Professor of Law and Sociology, Northwestern University and co-author of *Darfur and the Crime of Genocide*.

“No one has fought for justice in the Sudans like Eric Reeves. Don’t be deterred by the polemic: his sources are impeccable and his analyses spot on. This compendium by Professor Reeves will be indispensable to those needing a reference book for a vast and complex subject.”

**Gillian Lusk**, writer on Sudan and South Sudan

“For the past few years, while the world has been stunningly silent, Eric Reeves has continued to write about the atrocities and immensely destructive policies of the Sudan government. His 2007 book, *A Long Day’s Dying*, brought many of the atrocity crimes in Darfur to international attention. While some skeptics or deniers, such as Mahmood Mamdani, dismissed his writings, activists in Darfur and elsewhere continue to be sustained in their commitment by virtue of the research of *A Long Day’s Dying*.

His new and lengthy eBook, representing much of his writing from 2007 to the present, makes a great deal more key information available concerning the evolving crises in Darfur, the Nuba Mountains, Blue Nile, and the border region between North and South Sudan. In recent years the international community has chosen to turn a blind eye to what is happening in Darfur and Sudan. For his part, Eric Reeves has continued relentlessly to expose the failure of the international community in bringing about peace to Sudan, whether through implementing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005 or the UNAMID mission in Darfur.
Reeves’s new eBook contains 14 annexes, each dealing with a specific topic of controversy that demands to be read. I strongly urge those concerned about Sudan to read this new publication, which offers a sobering view of the deteriorating situation in both North and South Sudan.”

Mohammed Ahmed Eisa, Darfuri activist and the former director of the Amal Center for the Treatment and Rehabilitation of Victims of Torture (Nyala, South Darfur); Robert F. Kennedy human rights award laureate for 2007.
Compromising With Evil:  
An archival history of greater Sudan, 2007 – 2012

Preface

This extensive electronic text (eBook) attempts to provide an archival history of conflict, and its consequences, throughout greater Sudan over the past five years. The text comprises numerous analyses and publications by the author bearing on the continuing human catastrophe in Darfur, on the slow demise of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (2005), and on the antecedents and consequences of hostilities in Abyei, South Kordofan, and Blue Nile. The first main section of the text focuses on security and humanitarian conditions in Darfur during these years; the second attempts to explain the ultimate causes of the impending CPA collapse, and why this collapse has been allowed to occur; and the third looks closely at current violence and its immensely destructive consequences for civilians in Blue Nile and South Kordofan, and for refugees who have fled to the border states of South Sudan. In addition to almost 100,000 civilians who remain displaced from their homes in Abyei (mainly in Warrap State), the South has had to absorb as many as two hundred thousand refugees from northern Sudan at a time of acute food shortages and military turmoil in the South.

The Introduction and Conclusion to the text were written in August 2012, as were the various prefaces to different sections, including the fourteen topical annexes.

In some sense, this effort is an extension of my 2007 archival account of the early years of the Darfur genocide (A Long Day’s Dying: Critical Moments in the Darfur Genocide, Key Publishing/Toronto). With the advantages of electronic editing, this current text is far more extensive, more fully edited, and benefits from a much greater contextualizing and organizing of selected materials. And whereas the index to the earlier book was quite limited, the possibilities for an “index search” here are comprehensive and offer the means of locating all names, locations, agreements, groups, organizations, and key phrases and terms deployed in the text.

Prefaces, interpolated commentary, and summary observations within the three main sections and the topical annexes are shaded in grey to signal that they reflect current assessments. The archival selections themselves have been lightly edited for clarity and more substantially edited for length. These are edits for efficiency and ease of access, however—not revisions. To a much lesser degree, elements of the text have been edited for tense, formatting, consistency of orthography and usage, removal of typographic errors, and geographic specificity. Dates of original composition are indicated throughout. It has seemed important to create as useful an
organizational and narrative structure as possible, and in the interests of increasing
the definition of this narrative line, I have frequently edited pieces with an eye to
reducing overlap and emphasizing connections.

All italics in all quotations have been added unless otherwise indicated.

The second half of the text comprises fourteen annexes, each of which has been
edited to stand alone and begins with a preface written from the perspective of the
present. The annexes address particular topics and offer analyses that would be
difficult to incorporate within the main body of the text. Some analyses appear in-
dividually by virtue of their extensive treatment of a particular issue, such as rape
in Darfur, mortality in the region, and a monograph and data spreadsheet detailing
Khartoum’s aerial attacks on civilians from 1999 to the present. Others are comp-
pendia that draw together a series of shorter and more focused analyses on specific
topics. Still others attempt to bring together useful information that might otherwise
be too dispersed throughout this lengthy text: a highly detailed time-line concen-
trating on events of the past two years, for example, and synopses of all important
UN Security Council resolutions addressing issues in Sudan.

All material from which this text is drawn has been archived in the Human
Rights and Alternative Press Collections, Thomas J. Dodd Research Center, Uni-

Following the Bibliography (Annex bfXIV) is a guide to acronyms and a rost-
er identifying key agreements in Sudanese history of the past five years, as well as
individual actors, organizations, locations, and humanitarian terms of reference.
A historical time-line of events in Sudan, focusing on the past two years, appears as
Annex I; the final Annex (XIV) is a bibliography of all sources used in vari-
ous sections of the text. The eBook concludes with an Index that also contains a
photographic gallery of significant Sudanese political, humanitarian, and military
figures.

The inclusion of particular features in presentation, including linking and search
options, is designed to make navigation of this capacious electronic text altogeth-
er some 500,000 words as easy as possible. The Table of Contents, for example,
links directly to each of the main sections and the annexes, some of which have
their own detailed Table of Contents, linking to all sections within a given Annex.

Sources
A few comments on sources for these various texts are in order. One particular
source needs to be highlighted because of its prominence in the section on Darfur,
even as its international readership is miniscule. For almost four years Radio Da-
banga has been a critical conduit for information coming from the ground in Darfur. As a news source of now well-established authority it has particular importance, since neither UNAMID nor UN humanitarian officials now speak honestly about realities on the ground. Radio Dabanga’s truly extraordinary roster of sources, contacts, and conduits (electronic and otherwise) on the ground and in the diaspora, enables it to publish online a tremendous number of highly informed dispatches: about rapes of women and girls, murders, extortion, theft, land appropriations, camp conditions, assaults on IDPs, bombing attacks, and human displacement. It is an ambitious and unprecedented news source—and is presently all that prevents the suffering and insecurity in Darfur from being completely obscured by growing UN dishonesty and expediency. The grim obligation imposed is fully understood by Radio Dabanga.

I have also found the Sudan Tribune to be an indispensable source of news about northern and southern Sudan. Mohamed Nagi deserves tremendous credit as editor-in-chief for developing this critical on-line news source over the past five years; it now publishes news in English and Arabic, with journalists and reliable sources reporting from all parts of Sudan, Addis Ababa, Kampala, Cairo, and elsewhere. I’m grateful and honored to have published scores of analyses with Sudan Tribune over the course of its growth into a major news source.

One other publication deserves special note, since as my work over the past eight years has appeared regularly in Dissent Magazine, both in the quarterly print edition and on-line articles. Collectively, these fifty or so publications offer the best single view into my thinking and assessment at various junctures in Sudan’s history of this period. Editing at Dissent is consistently superb, and I have been the grateful beneficiary of this excellence. These pieces typically have the advantage of being relatively briefer (1,500 to 2,500 words), and often build on one another. Particularly for the national elections of 2010, it has seemed useful to gather my Dissent writings in Annex VII, along with other analyses. (Some sixty shorter but equally timely pieces have appeared in The New Republic and The Guardian [on-line]).

I have also frequently had recourse to confidential sources in my work, which presents a difficult ethical issue that I have tried address formally in an article in Dissent. In order to preserve and protect these sources, a number of whom are at considerable physical risk, I have sometimes blurred details and accounts sufficiently to make impossible any inadvertent self-identification; there has been no change in the character of the received information as I have presented it. When wearing a journalist’s hat, I have always accepted the ordinary responsibility to protect sources providing me with confidential information, even as I attempt to present precise and faithful accounts. When issues of personal security are at stake, how-
ever, I have felt an ethical obligation to take this additional step of obscuring any self-identifying features, or inadvertent identification by me. I have often consulted directly with my sources to be absolutely clear about risks.

In an important sense the present text is of course a work-in-progress, and many conclusions reached are necessarily provisional. Critical threats to peace and to civilian security remain, but hopes for a just peace are both inevitable and necessary. My website will continue to include regular updates, and the present eBook will have a section dedicated to consolidating updates on a quarterly basis (including the biannual results of my ongoing census of aerial attacks on civilian targets throughout greater Sudan.)

*****

My account of “‘Ahmed’ from Kassab Camp”—to whom this volume is in part dedicated—can be found here.
Acknowledgements

Over the past fourteen years it has been my great good fortune to have made many Sudanese friends, and to come to know well many who have worked long and hard for a just peace in Sudan. Their friendship, camaraderie, and good sense has sustained my efforts when at times they seemed impossible to continue. This list is far from complete (and indicates no institutional or organizational affiliation or any order of appreciation); but I must note in particular, in connection with my work of the past five years, members of the secret-no-more “Council”—Ted Dagne, Roger Winter, Brian D’Silva, John Prendergast, Francis Deng. I have also been sustained by my friendships and professional relationships with Jok Madut Jok, Pam Omidiyar, Sharon Hutchinson, Luka Biong, Gill Lusk, John Ashworth, Mohamed Nagi, Jean-Francois Darcq, Susannah Sirkin, Mia Farrow, Alhag Warrag, Jérôme Tubiana, John Ryle, Gerry Martone, Joe Read, Roméo Dallaire, Ken Isaacs, Pagan Amum, Yasir Arman, Jeb Sharp, Wasil Ali, Fatah Arman, Nathaniel Raymond, Julie Flint, John Nassar, Nick Serpe, David Del Conte, Esther Sprague, Omer Ismail, Bec Hamilton, Jan Coebergh, Malik Agar, Yehuda Bauer, Jennifer Leaning, Jill Savitt, Jim Abelee, Susan Rice, Peter Verney, Michael Walzer, Opheera McDoom, Douglas Johnson, Gerard Prunier, Sebastian Mallaby, John Hagan, and sadly a number of people whose security, or that of their colleagues, is sufficiently precarious that I cannot mention them here.

It gives me great pleasure to have this opportunity to express my deepest gratitude to Humanity United (San Francisco) for their critical supporting grants over the years; HU has in several ways underwritten this text. Additionally, I am very grateful for the generous subvention from Smith College that enabled the production of this eBook.

I am indebted to my colleagues at Smith College for their stimulating collaborative engagement in a yearlong Kahn Institute seminar addressing “evil” from a wide range of academic perspectives. If we came to no consensus on particular issues, our energetic discussions made clear how central—if unfathomable—this category of human behavior remains.

One especially engaged and enlivening participant in the seminar has been my research assistant for this project, Madeline Zehnder. She has proved, in a word, indispensable. This project simply could not have been completed without her intelligence, meticulous editing, and invaluable guidance on any number of technical, rhetorical, and organizational issues. I owe her more than I can say.

Finally, I am deeply indebted to the oncology staff at Dana Farber Cancer Institute, to my perpetually attentive personal physician and good friend Henry
Rosenberg—and to the loving presence of my two daughters, Meredith and Hannah (and our DB), and most of all to the love and care of my wife Nancy, who has made possible what work I’ve been able to accomplish.

Eric Reeves
Northampton, August 2012
A word on the photographs and web design

The photographs included within various sections of the text, as well as the gallery that follows the Index, come from a wide range of sources and I am deeply grateful to all of them. I have acknowledged these sources to the best of my ability, although some (especially from the Nuba Mountains) I have received without a clear indication of provenance. What we may be quite sure of is that images from the Nuba were sent into the world to convey the terrible suffering of the Nuba civilians. A few sources have specifically asked not to be credited. Occasionally a photograph from other regions of greater Sudan is not specifically credited; I have received over the years so many photographs without indication of provenance that I have on occasion found it impossible to render such credit. I will immediately credit—or remove—any photograph recognized as the intellectual property of an individual or organization that has not offered me permission for use. I have regarded UN photographs as in the public domain.

I am especially to Brian Steidle for his extraordinary photographs of Darfur from December 2004-05—a time when some have argued the Darfur genocide had begun to abate. His cover photograph and others that appear here suggest why many think otherwise. I am deeply grateful to Mia Farrow for her photographs of Darfur and eastern Chad and to the Enough Project (Washington, DC)—both of whom have made generous contributions to this collection. I am grateful as well to Ryan Boyette, an American aid worker married to a Nuba woman and remaining in the region through the entire conflict to date, despite immense danger. He and “Eyes and Ears of the Nuba” have provided me with some painfully telling photographs.

And I am particularly grateful to Dr. Tom Catena, the only surgeon in the Nuba, who works with extraordinary courage, operating on victims of shrapnel wounds caused by Antonov bombings. His are the most disturbing photographs, and I have included only some of what he has sent to me. Others, much more disturbing but highly revealing of the nature of Antonov bombing attacks and their consequences for the human body, are available upon request.

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peterchilton.com / Design and Photography

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Acronyms and names

Humanitarian organizations and terms

UN humanitarian organizations (and headquarters):

UNDP—UN Development Program
UNFAO—UN Food and Agriculture Organization
UNHCHR—UN High Commission for Human Rights (Geneva)
UNHCR—UN High Commission for Refugees
UNICEF—UN International Children’s Emergency Fund
UNOCHA—UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (also OCHA)
UNWFP—UN World Food Program (Rome) (also WFP)
UNWHO—UN World Health Organization (also WHO)

Nongovernmental humanitarian organizations:

ACF—Action Against Hunger (Action contre la faim)
AmC—Amal Center for the Treatment of Victims of Torture, Violence (and rape) located in Nyala, South Darfur
CRS—Catholic Relief Services
DCA—Danish Church Aid
GOAL—Irish nongovernmental humanitarian organization
ICRC—International Committee of the Red Cross
IRC—International Rescue Committee
Medair (Switzerland)
Médecins du Monde (France)
MC—Mercy Corps
MSF—Doctors Without Borders/Médecins Sans Frontières; French, Spanish, and Dutch national sections have been most active in Sudan
NPA—Norwegian People’s Aid
Oxfam—UK and American sections have been most active in Sudan
SC—Save the Children; UK, American, and Swedish sections have been most active in Sudan
SP—Samaritan’s Purse
Solidarités—France
SUDO—Sudan Social Development Organization

Other humanitarian agencies:

HAC—Khartoum’s “Humanitarian Aid Commission,” which has been responsible for the bureaucratic obstruction, harassment, and compromising of humanitarian activities
IOM—International Organization for Migration (intergovernmental)
USAID—U.S. Agency for International Development (increasingly under the sway of the U.S. State Department)

Key terms in humanitarian relief:

CMR—Crude Mortality Rate, which measures deaths per day per 10,000 of population
Diarrhea—a complex set of diseases, which often prove fatal, especially in the young; key distinction between clear and bloody diarrhea.
GAM—Global Acute Malnutrition. Rates in excess of 15 percent constitute a “humanitarian emergency”
IDP—Internally Displaced Person
MUAC—Mid-upper arm circumference (a malnutrition indicator)
SAM—Severe Acute Malnutrition; in children this is life-threatening in the short term without therapeutic intervention

Human rights, policy, and international justice organizations (and primary headquarters)

ACJPS—African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (London)
AI—Amnesty International (London)
CC—Carter Center (Atlanta)
HRF—Human Rights First (New York)
HRW—Human Rights Watch (New York)
ICG—International Crisis Group (Brussels)
Justice Africa (London)
OMCT—World Organization Against Torture
Pax Christi International (Brussels)
PCA—Permanent Court of Arbitration (The Hague)
PHR—Physicians for Human Rights (Cambridge, MA)
RI—Refugees International (Washington)
RVI—Rift Valley Institute (Nairobi)
SAS—Small Arms Survey (Geneva)
SOAT—Sudan Organization Against Torture

A brief selection of locations in Sudan and the region
(see map section of bibliography)

1956 border—the border between North and South as it existed on January 1, 1956, the day of Sudan’s independence from Anglo-Egyptian condominium rule; the CPA stipulates the 1956 border as the final determinant of the boundary between Sudan and South Sudan
Abyei town—the major town in Abyei; burned to the ground in May 2008 and May 2011
Abyei—contested area along the North/South border; Khartoum prevented the self-determination referendum scheduled for January 2011 per the terms of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement
Addis Ababa—capital of Ethiopia and headquarters for the African Union
Agok—town in Warrap State, close to the North/South border; most refugees from Abyei flee to Agok in May 2008 and again in May 2011
Bentiu—capital of Unity State; heavily bombed in April 2012
Blue Nile—northern state with a large population that identifies itself with South Sudan
Doro, al-Jamam, and Jahlak—refugee camps within Upper Nile
El-Fasher—capital of North Darfur; site of largest military base in Darfur
El-Geneina—capital of West Darfur
Heilig/Panthou—contested oil production site on the North/South border
Jau (Jaw)—town on the North/South border region; ethnically defined by the presence of the Dinka Panarou
Jebel Marra—the mountainous plateau straddling North, South, and West Darfur
Juba—capital of South Sudan; a major garrison town for Khartoum during the civil war
Kadugli—capital of South Kordofan
Kafia Kingi—a large enclave in Western Bahr el-Ghazal, appropriated into the north by Khartoum in 1960. Although all maps clearly indicate that the enclave belongs to South Sudan, it has nonetheless been a point of military tension for many months.
Kauda—the center of the Nuba Mountains
Khartoum—capital of (northern) Sudan. Located at the convergence of the Blue and White Nile Rivers
Kiir Adem—important town in Northern Bahr el-Ghazal; threatened by SAF in January 2012; bombed in November 2010 (confirmed by Associated Press)
Kurmuk—major town in southern Blue Nile; the last bastion of SPLA-N before it fell to Khartoum’s SAF in November 2011
N’Djamena—capital of Chad
Omdurman—twin city to Khartoum, lying west of the Nile; Sudan’s largest city
Nuba Mountains—in the center of South Kordofan
Nyala—capital of South Darfur and the most populous city in Darfur
River Kiir/Bahr el-Arab—meandering river that roughly defines most of the North/South border
South Kordofan—northern state with a large population that identifies itself with South Sudan
Tishwin—location of major SPLA garrison in Unity State
Unity State—oil-rich border state in South Sudan; many refugees from the Nuba have fled to camps in Unity State
Upper Nile—oil-rich border state in South Sudan; many refugees from Blue Nile have fled to camps in Upper Nile

Yafta and Guffa—locations within Upper Nile bombed on November 8, 2012

Yei—town in Central Equatoria repeatedly and notoriously bombed by Khartoum, including its hospital and cathedral

Yida—site of refugee camp in Unity State; the camp was bombed by Khartoum on November 10, 2011

News sources used most frequently

AC—Africa Confidential; perhaps the single most authoritative source for background information on Sudan

AFP—Agence France-Presse; very good general source

Al-Jazeera (English)—intrepid reporters, and many extremely revealing dispatches

AP—Associated Press; much excellent work

Bloomberg—very reliable

Daily Star (Lebanon)—excellent op/ed page

The Guardian (UK)

IWPR—Institute for War and Peace Reporting (The Hague); excellent longer dispatches

Los Angeles Times

McClatchey—excellent work, though increasingly with an anti-Juba bias

NYT—New York Times; much superb work, with the exception of a very misleading report on Darfur in February 2012

RD—Radio Dabanga; an extraordinary network of sources within Darfur

Reuters—the best of the wire services in Sudan

Ryan Boyette—an American living in the Nuba Mountains who reports regularly on humanitarian conditions and aerial bombing attacks (www.nubareports.org)

SAS—Small Arms Survey (Geneva); the best reporting on weapons and weapon flows in South Sudan and the border regions; their longer reports are prepared by internationally recognized experts

SMC—Sudan Media Center; a primary regime propaganda organ
SSP—Satellite Sentinel Project. Conducts satellite surveillance of conflict areas in Sudan’s border regions

ST—Sudan Tribune; now the most important news source for greater Sudan

Sudan Vision—online regime propaganda organ

SUNA—Sudan News Agency; mouthpiece for the regime with no journalistic independence

The Independent (UK)—excellent reporting on the Nuba and South Kordofan

Tom Catena—a physician, perhaps the only one in the Nuba Mountains, who provides real-time information, if on a sporadic basis

UN IRIN—UN Integrated Regional Information Networks; independent and does a great deal of excellent reporting

UN News Centre (New York)—reports only official UN views

VOA—Voice of America; relatively independent source

Washington Post

Military actors, peacekeeping forces, and terms of reference in Sudan

Abu Tira—the Central Reserve Police (CRP); many former Janjaweed have been recycled into CRP and other paramilitary forces under Khartoum’s control

AMIS—African Union Mission in Sudan (Darfur mission ended December 31, 2007)

Antonov—Russian cargo planes retrofitted as “bombers”; crude, imprecise barrel bombs are rolled out the back cargo bay

BIB—Border Intelligence Brigade; another paramilitary force in Darfur

Janjaweed—Arab militia groups of various degrees of organization and strength; used by Khartoum throughout the counter-insurgency in Darfur

JEM—Justice and Equality Movement; led by Djibril Ibrahim, brother of Khalil Ibrahim, former head of JEM

jihad—“holy struggle, or war”

LRA—the Lord’s Resistance Army, a highly destructive Ugandan militia force; led by Joseph Kony, the LRA for years created an environment of overwhelming fear in northern Uganda. Kony has been forced to move his operations to South Sudan,
northern Democratic Republic of Congo, and Central African Republic; Khartoum has admitted to using the LRA as a military proxy in South Sudan

MI—Military Intelligence, the dominant security force in Darfur; increasingly powerful as a political force in Khartoum

mujahideen—roughly translated as a military force of “holy warriors”

NISS—National Intelligence and Security Service; a vast and ruthless security force, whose primary task is regime preservation, it has many parallel services keeping an eye on one another

PDF—Popular Defense Forces; a notoriously brutal paramilitary militia force deployed by Khartoum in Darfur, South Sudan, and the Nuba Mountains

RMG—“Rebel”/Renegade Militia Groups; militias in South Sudan funded, armed, and otherwise supplied by Khartoum; they have no political agenda other than looting and civilian terror (see George Athor and Peter Gadet below)

SAF—Sudan Armed Forces; Khartoum’s regular military forces.

SLA—Sudan Liberation Army; the SLA has split, reconfigured, and split again; the primary forces are those of Minni Minawi and Abdel Wahid el-Nur

SPLA-N—Sudan People’s Liberation Army-North, comprising elements of the former SPLA who remained in South Kordofan and Blue Nile

SPLA—Sudan People’s Liberation Army (now the Army of the Republic of South Sudan)

SRF—Sudan Revolutionary Front; a coalescing of the various SLA and JEM rebel groups, the SPLA-N, and the forces of the Beja Congress in eastern Sudan

UN DPKO—UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (New York)

UN Panel of Experts on Darfur—Created by UN Security Council Resolution 1591, with a mandate to monitor the embargo on arms to Darfur and aerial attacks in the region; the UN has allowed it to collapse as an effective monitoring team

UNAMID—UN/African Union Mission in Darfur (mission began January 1, 2008)

UNMIS—UN Mission in Sudan (mission began in 2005 and ended in 2011)

UNMISS—UN Mission in South Sudan (mission began in 2012); no northern access
Names of governments, negotiating bodies, and major signed agreements

**Arab League**—at various points has attempted to intervene diplomatically in peace negotiations involving Khartoum and other Sudanese parties; dominated by Egypt, these efforts have consistently supported the NIF/NCP regime

**AUHIP**—African Union High-Level Panel on Implementation; the “implementation” is nominally of the “roadmap for peace in Darfur” produced by chair Thabo Mbeki in 2010; this failing, Mbeki moved on to the Abyei file and is now lead AU negotiator in Addis Ababa for talks between Khartoum and Juba

**Cessation of Offensive Hostilities Agreement**—October 15, 2002; the beginning of the end of major military action between Khartoum’s SAF and the South’s SPLA


**DPA**—Darfur Peace Agreement (Abuja, Nigeria; May 2006)

**DDPD**—Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (Doha, Qatar; July 2011); signed by onesmall, factitious rebel group (the “Liberation and Justice Movement”); overwhelmingly rejected by Darfuris

**Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement**—October 2006; terms never implemented

**“Friends of IGAD”**—consortium of European and North American countries supporting IGAD in the Naivasha peace process

**GOS**—Government of Sudan; dominated by the NIF/NCP

**GOSS**—Government of South Sudan

**Heidelberg Darfur Dialogue**—European effort to create a meaningful peace dialogue involving Darfuri civil society; Khartoum refused to allow representatives of the Heidelberg group to attend peace talks in Doha

**IGAD**—Intergovernmental Authority for Development (East African consortium that provided auspices for the Naivasha negotiations)

**Machakos Protocol**—the breakthrough agreement (July 2002) guaranteeing South Sudan the right to a self-determination referendum

**NIF/NCP**—National Islamic Front/National Congress Party (seized power as the NIF in June 1989)

**Peace agreement with the Eastern Front (Fall 2006)**—Yet another failed peace agreement; the Eastern Front had largely collapsed militarily with the signing of the CPA, and had little negotiating leverage with Khartoum

**RSS**—Republic of South Sudan
SOFA—Status of Forces Agreement; signed in February 2008 for Darfur
UN Secretariat—responsible for variously failed attempts to negotiate peace and protect civilians in greater Sudan
United States special envoys to Sudan—reporting to the President, these envoys have often represented remarkable and disturbing policy views

Names of major political and military figures in Khartoum

Ahmed Mohamed Haroun Adam—former State Minister for Interior; first member of the NIF/NCP indicted for atrocity crimes by the ICC; currently governor of South Kordofan
Al-Sadiq Siddig al-Mahdi—head of the National Umma Party (NUP), another of the traditional sectarian political parties; Prime Minister of Sudan from 1986 to 1989; head of the Ansar sect
Ali Ahmed Karti—long-time NIF/NCP stalwart; now Foreign Minister; headed the PDF during the civil war
Ali Osman Mohamed Taha—first vice-president of the regime; negotiated the CPA, which was regarded by many within the regime and the army as a betrayal and sign of weakness; relationship with al-Bashir and the military uncertain
Field Marshal Omar Hassan Ahmed al-Bashir—President of the NIF/NCP regime; indicted by the ICC for atrocity crimes in Darfur, including genocide
General Abdel Rahim Mohamed Hussein—Defence Minister and former Interior Minister during the most violent years of the Darfur genocide; indicted by the ICC for atrocity crimes in Darfur
General Awad Ibn Auf—former head of Military Intelligence; gave the order for the SAF and Janjaweed “to destroy everything” in Darfur
General Haj Ahmed Algaily Ahmed—army chief of staff
General Salah Abdallah “Gosh”—former powerful head of the intelligence services; the reason for his fall from favor is not fully clear
Ghazi Salah el-Din Atabani—long-time NIF/NCP stalwart whose political fortunes have risen and fallen repeatedly
Gutbi al-Mahdi Mohamed—seasoned political secretary (politburo chief) of the NIF/NCP
Hassan Abdullah al-Turabi—the Popular Congress Party (PCP) is now the politi-
cal vehicle of for al-Turabi, the radical Islamist leader who fell out with the central NIF/NCP leaders in 1999

**Ja’afar Mohamed Nimeiri**—military officer who came to power by military coup in 1969 and remained president until deposed in 1985; civil war began in 1983 with his attempt to impose *sharia* throughout Sudan, and re-divide the South (died May 2009)

**Lt. Gen. Ismat Abdel Rahman al-Zain**—implicated in Darfur atrocity crimes because of his role as SAF director of operations (Khartoum); he is identified in the “confidential Annex” to the report by UN panel of Experts on Darfur (Annex leaked in February 2006); Ismat was one of two generals who in May 2011 confronted al-Bashir, demanding that the military take over decisions about war and peace in Abyei and other border regions

**Major General Adam Hamid Musa**—chair of the Council of States

**Major General Ahmad Khamis**—commander of the 14th Sudan Armed Forces infantry division in Kadugli (scene of atrocity crimes in June–July 2011)

**Major General Bakri Salih**—former Defense Minister; now senior minister for presidential affairs; very influential in current political environment (see above entries for General Sharfi and Ismat)

**Major General Mahjoub Abdallah Sharfi**—head of Military Intelligence, and second of the two generals who in May 2011 confronted al-Bashir, demanding that the military take over decisions about war and peace in Abyei and other border regions

**Mohammed Osman al-Mirghani**—head of the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), one of the two traditional sectarian political parties; head of the Khatmiyya sect

**Mustafa Osman Ismail**—senior presidential advisor to al-Bashir; former Foreign Minister; founding secretary general (1990) of People’s Arab Islamic Conference (characterized by the authoritative *Africa Confidential* as being “later seen as cradle of Al Qaida”)

**Nafi’e Ali Nafi’e**—long-time senior presidential adviser and power broker; until the events of 2011, one of the very most powerful members of the NIF/NCP
Names of major political figures in South Sudan (including Abyei), South Kordofan, and Blue Nile

*Southern and SPLA/M-North leadership:*

**Abdel Aziz el-Hilu**—Nuba leader of the SPLA-N in South Kordofan; won the May 2011 election for governor of South Kordofan, but Khartoum engineered a victory for **Ahmed Haroun**; Abdel Aziz is widely regarded as an uncommonly skilled military leader and has consistently routed the SAF in the Nuba

**Deng Alor**—South Sudan’s first foreign minister and minister of cabinet affairs

**John Garang**—charismatic founder and leader of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement; leader of the Bor Revolt that marked the beginning of the second civil war (1983–2005); led negotiations for the South that produced the CPA; killed in a helicopter crash, July 2005

**Luka Biong**—SPLM member; chief Southern representative of the Abyei Joint Oversight Committee (he is from Abyei); executive director of (not-for-profit) Kush Inc.

**Malik Agaar**—formerly governor of Blue Nile deposed by Khartoum following the military assault of September 1, 2011; a powerful leader within the SPLA/M, he is now equally powerful as leader of the SPLA/M-North

**Nhial Deng**—long-time fighter with the SPLA; now Sudan’s foreign minister

**Pagan Amum**—long-time SPLA/M leader; as of July 2012 leading negotiations with Khartoum over unresolved issues

**Salva Kiir**—a long-time deputy to John Garang, Kiir became president of the Government of South Sudan following Garang’s death

**Yasir Arman**—Secretary General of the SPLM-North and Secretary of External Affairs for the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF)

**Yusef Kuwa**—led the people of the Nuba through the campaign of extinction waged by Khartoum in the 1990s; one of the great men to emerge in the civil war
UN, AU, and international leadership in Sudan:

(Only European and American hemisphere names are ordered with last name first; there are too many variations in name order and transliteration for many African, African, and Asian names, and these are ordered by first letter of first name to be included)

Guéhenno, Jean-Marie—former head of UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, including during the time of UNAMID authorization and deployment

Haile Menkerios—an Eritrean diplomat and the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Sudan

Johnson, Hilde—Norwegian diplomat, instrumental in negotiating the CPA; she now heads the UN mission in South Sudan

Ladsous, Hevré—new head of UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations; convinced that security on the ground in Darfur has improved sufficiently to permit a draw-down of UNAMID police and military personnel

Moreno-Ocampo, Luis—Prosecutor for the ICC

Navi Pillay—UN High Commissioner for Human Rights; bears much responsibility for the slow response to the atrocity crimes in South Kordofan reported in great detail by a UN human rights team on the ground in June 2011

Thabo Mbeki—chief African Union diplomat on the Sudan portfolio; failed to resolve the Abyei crisis and is distrusted by South Sudan

Valerie Amos—head of UN OCHA and UN Emergency Humanitarian Coordinator

U.S. political and diplomatic leaders on Sudan:

Clinton, Hillary—U.S Secretary of State in the Obama administration

Gration, Scott—appointed by President Barack Obama as U.S special envoy for Sudan in March 2009; from the very beginning, Gration revealed ignorance of Sudan’s history, and was distrusted by humanitarian organizations, Darfuris, diplomats, South Sudanese, the people of Abyei, and human rights activists. Gration was recently fired from his new position as U.S. ambassador to Kenya

Kerry, Senator John—ad hoc Obama administration envoy to Sudan in 2009 and 2010; declared in April 2009 that humanitarian capacity lost with the March expulsions could be replaced in a matter of weeks following “an agreement with Khartoum”; promoted “compromise” on Abyei (fall 2010)
Lyman, Princeton—Scott Gration’s successor as special envoy; he is committed to the notion that the Khartoum regime can oversee democratic transformation in Sudan

Rice, Susan—U.S. ambassador to the UN; she is a former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs; in policy debates with Gration, she was consistently overruled by the intelligence community, which sees in Khartoum an indispensable ally in the “war on terror”

Smith, Dane—U.S. diplomat assigned to Darfur; Smith has experience but no mandate or political power, and has been given the impossible task of helping oversee implementation of the “Doha Document for Peace in Darfur”

Other actors of consequence:

George Athor—now dead; while alive, Athor (a former senior officer in the SPLA) was leader of one of the most dangerous and destructive of the so-called “Rebel/Renegade Militia Groups” (RMG), supplied and armed by Khartoum

David Yau Yau—one of the most ruthless of the RMG, operating primarily in Jonglei

Girifna—Arabic for “we’ve had enough”; an opposition group working non-violently for regime change in Sudan; the group formed in 2011, but the uprising began in Khartoum in earnest in late June 2012

Idriss Déby—President of Chad; he engaged in a proxy war with Khartoum during the early years of the Darfur genocide, making the border areas between the two countries extremely dangerous; he supported the JEM in particular because of its Zaghawa dominance

Isaias Afwerki—President of Eritrea, Isaias is trying to establish a closer relationship with Khartoum; during the civil war he supported the military rebellion in eastern Sudan (dominated by the SPLA); war with Ethiopia remains a clear possibility

Johnson Olonyi—leader of primarily Shilluk RMG in Upper Nile

Meles Zenawi—President of Ethiopia and neighbor to Sudan and South Sudan; in a “wiki-leaked” cable dated January 30, 2009, Zenawi tells the U.S. that toppling the Khartoum regime is the best option for dealing with Sudan’s crises; Meles died in August 2012

Peter Gadet—another RMG leader and feared military commander; he has de-
fected back to the SPLA (though he has defected and re-defected perhaps a dozen times)

Yoweri Kaguta Museveni—president of Uganda

**Names of major political figures and military actors in Darfur:**

Abdel Wahid el-Nur—a Fur and leader of what remains of the original Sudan Liberation Movement/Army; his military strength lies primarily in Jebel Marra, but he has long been a favorite of Darfuris in the IDP camps, although this favor has waned in recent years; the Fur are the largest tribal group in Darfur

Ali Kushayb—the *nom du guerre* for one of the most notorious *Janjaweed* leaders; known as the “colonel of colonels,” Kushayb is responsible for some of the worst mass atrocities in West Darfur, especially in the Wadi Saleh region; he was one of the first to be indicted by the ICC for atrocity crimes

Ban Ki-moon—Ban came into the role of UN Secretary-General promising to make Darfur a “signature issue”; instead, he quickly found himself overwhelmed by Khartoum’s intransigence, and has failed to secure either peace or justice in Darfur or greater Sudan in his first full term of office

Charpentier, George—previously the UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Sudan; in this role he declared that Khartoum was not interfering with humanitarian access; his assessment has been widely and substantially contradicted by nongovernmental humanitarian organizations, as well as by UN humanitarian officials

Cycmanick, Christopher—spokesman for UNAMID. In an interview with Radio Dabanga (May 20, 2012), he “described the security situation in Darfur as ‘relatively calm’”

Djbril Ibrahim—Khalil’s brother, now head of the Justice and Equality Movement

El-Tigani Ateem Seisi—a Fur and former governor of Darfur, Seisi was the only Darfuri signatory to the “Doha Document for Peace in Darfur” (July 2011); he signed on behalf of a small, militarily and politically powerless group know as the Liberation and Justice Movement (LJM); the peace agreement has been overwhelmingly rejected by Darfuri civil society, camp leaders, and rebel groups of consequence

Ibrahim Gambari—leader of UNAMID in Darfur; he has failed to confront Khartoum over its many refusals of access to UNAMID investigators and refuses to speak honestly about either security conditions or the humanitarian situation
Khalil Ibrahim—former head of the Justice and Equality Movement, Khalil refused to sign the May 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement; his past connections with Hassan al-Turabi and the Islamists in Khartoum make many Darfuris uneasy about his true agenda; Khalil fought with the PDF during the civil war

Kofi Annan—in speaking about Darfur in April 2004, former UN Secretary General Annan invoked Rwanda and the failure of the international community (Annan was head of UN peacekeeping before and during the genocide); he appeared to promise humanitarian intervention but was soon checked by the UN political leadership

Martin Luther Agwai—first UNAMID force commander; he left his position at the same time as Rodolphe Adada, echoing his words about the “end of major violence Darfur”

Minni Minawi—a Zaghawa and leader of the Sudan Liberation Army/Movement-Minni Minawi (SLA/M-MM); Minawi was the sole signatory of the 2005 Darfur Peace Agreement in Abuja, and signed only under duress; he left the regime he had become part of in later 2010, setting in motion violent military conflict and Zaghawa civilian destruction that continues to the present

Musa Hilal—the most infamous of the various Janjaweed leaders, Hilal is perhaps best known for his direction of the Tawila slaughter of late February 2004, and his directive to “change the demography of Darfur” and “empty it of African tribes”

Rodolphe Adada—Gambari’s predecessor, notable mainly for declaring on his departure in 2009 that major violence had ended in Darfur
Compromising with Evil: An archival history of greater Sudan, 2007 – 2012

Introduction

For more than two decades in greater Sudan (now two countries, but formerly one), the scale of human suffering and destruction has been almost incomprehensible. Military violence has displaced—often deliberately—millions of civilians throughout all regions of greater Sudan; civilian mortality from all causes—including violence, malnutrition, and disease—approaches or exceeds 3 million and is again poised to explode upwards.\textsuperscript{1} Even within this context, the past five years have been some of the most destructive in Sudanese history. Despite the 2005 “Comprehensive Peace Agreement,” Sudan and South Sudan were recently on the brink of renewed war; and as Sudan’s grim history makes clear, it will inevitably be civilians—primarily women and children—who suffer most during any such renewed military confrontation. The risk of war is heightened by imploding economies in both Sudan and South Sudan. In Khartoum and elsewhere in Sudan, the uncontrollable rise in prices, especially for food, has generated the first genuine popular threat to twenty-three years of tyrannical rule by the National Islamic Front/National Congress Party (NIF/NCP). The response by regime security forces has been predictably sharp and brutal.

At the same time, humanitarian crises of an extraordinary scale continue to escalate throughout Sudan. Humanitarian conditions are also dire in the border regions between Sudan and South Sudan, as well as in areas of South Sudan where independence has done little to remove the threat of hunger or address the need for clean water, schools and hospitals, and economic infrastructure. Exacerbating these problems, Khartoum continues to wage debilitating economic warfare against the South, where it also actively supports and arms renegade militia groups whose only agenda is the creation of civilian chaos.\textsuperscript{2} On a regional level, security is threatened by refugee movements from Sudan to South Sudan and Ethiopia, as well as by the growing possibility of spillover violence. Yet international response to the crises has been consistently diffident—to often focused on one issue at the expense of others equally important for a just peace and true end to war in Sudan.

Conflict numbers alone are utterly shocking, even as they have no apparent power to outrage. Some 1.5 million people in Darfur have been newly displaced since 2007, including as many as 1.2 million since the UN/African Union Mission in Darfur officially took up its Security Council civilian protection mandate on January 1, 2008 (with Chapter 7 authority).\textsuperscript{3} Well over 2 million Darfuris live in
squalid and dangerous camps as Internally Displaced Persons or refugees in eastern Chad; a large displaced population also lives with host families or villages. Many displaced persons—for example, in the Jebel Marra region—cannot even be assessed because of restrictions Khartoum imposes on researchers and aid organizations. Insecurity—some random, but much engineered or countenanced by Khartoum—has drastically reduced humanitarian presence and access in all regions of Darfur. As a direct consequence, health and malnutrition indicators are increasingly ominous. Khartoum’s genocidal counter-insurgency in the region has resulted in the deaths of more than 500,000 people since 2003, overwhelmingly civilians from non-Arab or African tribal groups.4 (See Annex III.)

In the Nuba Mountains of South Kordofan and in Blue Nile, some 1 million people have been displaced from their homes. More than 250,000 of these people are now refugees in South Sudan, Ethiopia, or even Kenya’s Kakuma Camp, and their number has grown relentlessly through August 2012. In June 2012 Doctors Without Borders/ Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) estimated that approximately 4,000 refugees a day were arriving in Southern camps (Upper Nile and Unity States) from Blue Nile and South Kordofan.5 All other relief organizations report horrific conditions in the camps. At the same time, some 100,000 Dinka Ngok remain displaced in South Sudan (most in Warrap State), where they fled following Khartoum’s May 2011 seizure of the region.6 This military aggression abrogated the terms of both the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (2005) and the “final and binding” 2009 ruling on Abyei by the Permanent Court of Arbitration (The Hague). The conditions in which these displaced people live are also dire and their acute needs for food and shelter add to the monumental struggle to address food insecurity in the South.

By the time the rains had begun in earnest in late spring 2012, refugees arriving in the South were typically in highly alarming physical condition. Even more alarming were their accounts of the vast numbers who remained behind or were unable to travel south: the elderly, the infirm, young children, the sick and the wounded, and those caring for these people. Many of those who reached the camps arrived simply to die; dehydration, malnutrition, and an absence of primary medical care have already killed many who have made the arduous trek to Upper Nile and Unity states.7 Mortality and malnutrition rates are ratcheting upwards.

Within both the Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile, Khartoum’s Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) continue to engage in a relentless aerial assault on civilians and agricultural production. For the second year in a row, there will be no significant harvest in either region. People who remain have been forced to flee their homes for caves or ravines in the hills, where they have no food supplies and often no easy access to water. A series of highly authoritative reports from the ground reveal that these people are barely surviving, eating grass, leaves, roots, and insects, often with
severely debilitating health consequences. At the same time, Khartoum—with full knowledge of the civilian consequences of its military actions—refuses to grant international humanitarian access to these desperate populations.\(^8\) Tens of thousands will die, and without humanitarian access, hundreds of thousands may perish.

The character of war in South Kordofan was evident almost immediately after the regime initiated fighting on June 5, 2011. UN human rights investigators, journalists, and eyewitnesses who made their way to South Sudan gave shocking accounts of widespread atrocity crimes.\(^9\) Despite Khartoum’s efforts at concealment, satellite surveillance photography also established that during June 2011 and beyond, Khartoum’s forces executed or murdered thousands of people in and around Kadugli, capital of South Kordofan, subsequently burying them in mass graves.\(^10\) Findings from satellite imagery were confirmed by a large number of people who witnessed the slaughter in Kadugli.

Although the civilians targeted were nominally supporters of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North, people of the Nuba tribal group were in fact killed indiscriminately. At roadblocks reminiscent of Rwanda, in house-to-house searches, and even within the protective perimeter of the UN’s mission in Kadugli (UNMIS), Nuba were targeted on the basis of ethnicity, not political affiliation. Evidence from a UN human rights team in Kadugli during the killings reveals that more than 7,000 people seeking protection within the UN security perimeter in Kadulgi were removed by Khartoum’s security forces on June 20, 2011; we have heard nothing of these people since, even as the number of mass graves continued to increase.\(^11\)

The regime’s aerial bombardment has been relentless and has consistently targeted civilians and humanitarians. During the past five years more than 1,000 confirmed aerial attacks on civilian and humanitarian targets occurred throughout Darfur, the Nuba Mountains, Blue Nile, and South Sudan; this figure vastly understates the number of attacks that have actually occurred (see Annex II.) Nonetheless, the available data and reports make clear that these aerial assaults are war crimes under the Rome Statute that is the treaty basis for the International Criminal Court; collectively, the attacks are crimes against humanity as defined by the Statute.\(^12\) Such use of military aircraft against civilians—over a sustained period of time and against people native to the country launching the assaults—is historically unprecedented, Syria notwithstanding.

Numbers, of course, can tell only part of the story, but they convey indirectly the large-scale international failures that have allowed these atrocity crimes to continue. Indeed, if there is a primary goal to this archival project, it is to ensure that those who bear most responsibility for allowing the current regime in Khartoum to continue its savage tyranny will never be able to say, “we didn’t know.” Documenta-
tion in the present text is heavy, precisely to forestall any self-exculpation based on claims of ignorance. In the case of Rwanda there were many claims of ignorance, and the time-frame for the actual slaughter—a mere 100 days—was indeed highly compressed. Action was possible, but required decisiveness and moral courage that were nowhere evident except in the UN force commander, Lt.-General Roméo Dallaire, and other members of the UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR). In Sudan, by contrast, we have watched as a painfully slower time-line of genocidal destruction unfolds, extending over decades as the Khartoum regime has attempted to retain its grip on power with relentless attacks on civilians in the marginalized regions of greater Sudan.

**Points of emphasis**

As indicated in the table of contents, the main archival text consists of three sections, each with its own points of emphasis, though inevitably there is some overlap. Following the main text and conclusion are fourteen Annexes that address specific issues related to these three primary sections. If there is a constant theme within the material, it is the role of the National Islamic Front/National Congress Party (NIF/NCP) as the source of conflict and humanitarian crises throughout greater Sudan. That Sudanese people have suffered so terribly, while the NIF/NCP has so long been conspicuously at fault, should occasion the deepest shame on the part of the international community. If this shame exists, it has not been translated into a sustained effort to recognize and address the evil embodied in the NIF/NCP regime.

**Darfur**

This first section examines the situation in Darfur over the past five years and is organized around three central issues, addressed in two main parts of the Section: (a) the international failure to deploy an effective protective force capable of providing security to both civilians and humanitarians in a region wracked by genocidal counter-insurgency warfare; (b) the deterioration in humanitarian conditions during this period, particularly following Khartoum’s March 4, 2009 expulsion of thirteen key international relief organizations; and (c) the distortion of Darfur’s realities by the UN, the AU, the U.S., and other international actors. These misrepresentations have culminated in the decision to reduce UNAMID’s force size on the basis of an untenable claim of “improved security.”

In fact, insecurity in Darfur is now the preeminent issue, yet there is little international reporting on the scale of civilian insecurity or the scope of major military fighting. This latter issue is addressed in an important July 2012 report from the
Small Arms Survey (SAS), “Forgotten Darfur: Old Tactics and New Players.” Authors Claudio Gramizzi and Jérôme Tubiana particularly focus on Khartoum’s increasing use of non-Arab militias against non-Arab tribal groups (primarily the Zaghawa). This dangerous new development follows withdrawal from the Khartoum regime by Minni Minawi, a Zaghawa and the only signatory to the disastrous 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA). The SAS report, however, deals largely with eastern Darfur: to get a broader sense of insecurity in the daily lives of Darfuri civilians, we need the reporting resources of Radio Dabanga. I have archived a great many of Radio Dabanga dispatches from 2010 to 2012, and they appear as Annex VIII.

Widespread, ethnically-motivated violence directed against civilians living in or near IDP camps has risen dramatically in recent months, making nonsense of UN claims about “improved security” in justifying the drawdown of UNAMID. Indeed, violence is endemic throughout Darfur, which has experienced a sharp increase in murders and shootings, a continuing epidemic of rape, the shutdown of key roads, brutal extortion schemes, and the continued appropriation of arable lands by Arab groups from Darfur as well as from Chad, Niger, and even Mali. Huge areas of Darfur are also beyond the reach of relief organizations. Humanitarian personnel and resources are concentrated increasingly near the three major urban areas: Nyala, el-Fasher, and el-Geneina.

Any assessment of current violence and insecurity must examine the weak international response to what informed observers recognized as genocide—or at least violent “ethnic cleansing”—by 2004. At this point, the brutal predations of Arab Janjaweed militias working in concert with Khartoum’s regular forces had destroyed hundreds of villages, displaced hundreds of thousands, and, as we would learn later, killed over one hundred thousand people.

What we knew

In February 2004, almost one year into the genocide, I argued in the Washington Post:

There can be no reasonable skepticism about Khartoum’s use of these militias to “destroy, in whole or in part, ethnic or racial groups”—in short, to commit genocide. Khartoum has so far refused to rein in its Arab militias; has refused to enter into meaningful peace talks with the insurgency groups; and, most disturbingly, has refused to grant unrestricted humanitarian access. The international community has been slow to react to Darfur’s catastrophe and has yet to move with sufficient urgency and commitment. A credible peace forum must be rapidly cre-
ated. Immediate plans for humanitarian intervention should begin. The alternative is to allow tens of thousands of civilians to die in the weeks and months ahead in what will be continuing genocidal destruction.¹⁴

Ultimately hundreds of thousands, not tens of thousands, would die in the months and years subsequent to this plea. Instead of the necessary intervention to halt the slaughter, international response came in two forms: a definition of the genocide as a “humanitarian crisis” and the expression of reliance on the newly-created African Union to provide “security.” These responses were disingenuous on two counts. Firstly, the “humanitarian crisis” was neither spontaneous nor the product of natural causes, but the direct result of Khartoum’s counter-insurgency strategy of genocidal violence and the mass displacement of civilians, which was intended to weaken the rebels’ civilian base of support. Secondly, the fledgling AU Peace and Security Council had virtually no standby capacity and was thus completely unprepared to take on a mission of this scale, complexity, and logistical difficulty.

Nonetheless, the first AU mission in Darfur (the “AU Mission in Sudan,” or AMIS) began to deploy in June 2004. Initially, AMIS consisted of a few hundred military observers and protection forces, who were utterly powerless to affect the situation on the ground—or even to monitor the region, which is the size of Spain. By late 2005 the augmented version of the force was still woefully inadequate: it was unable to take on its mandate to provide civilian protection and to secure access for humanitarian organizations trying to reach desperate civilian populations.¹⁵

The character of the second, highly belated African Union force resulted from international compromise with the Khartoum regime. Both the UN Security Council and Secretariat had failed to press for deployment of the robust UN peace support force authorized in Security Council Resolution 1706 (August 2006), and rapid capitulation before the regime’s refusal to accept this resolution led to yearlong negotiations over the character of a force acceptable to Khartoum.¹⁶

Negotiations that began in Addis Ababa in November 2006 culminated in Security Council Resolution 1769 (July 2007), which authorized an unprecedented UN/AU “hybrid” force whose failure was built into the terms of its deployment.¹⁷ Leadership issues, lack of coordination between national elements of the virtually all-African forces (one of Khartoum’s demands), lack of suitable equipment and transport, poor logistics, and—critically—the absence of decisive international political and material support ensured disaster. The failures of the UN/AU Mission for Darfur (UNAMID) are a central concern of this first section.

The potential catastrophe that may yet proceed from this failure is all too apparent. If security continues to deteriorate, humanitarian operations will cease, resulting in heightened levels of morbidity and mortality among Darfur’s over 2 million
displaced persons as well as among a conflict-affected Darfuri population twice this number. An account from August 2012 offers a preview of the consequences of insecurity in Darfur: humanitarians on the ground reported that Kutum town—a major urban site in North Darfur—had been overrun by Arab militia forces:

All of the international nongovernmental humanitarian organizations and UN offices in the area have been thoroughly looted and their staff relocated to El Fasher. [(18)](#notes) All of the IDPs from Kassab IDP camp have been displaced. The markets in Kutum and in Kassab have both been thoroughly looted.18

Again, Kutum is a major town in North Darfur, and the loss of security in this region is immensely consequential. Perhaps the UN has determined that the cost of UNAMID—the world’s most expensive peacekeeping operation as well as its least effective—is exorbitant and cannot be justified in the context of other global peacekeeping needs. But this must be said publicly and forthrightly, not by claiming “improvement” in a human security situation that recent events in Kutum and Kassab reveal has in fact badly deteriorated in 2012.

**Rape of women and girls in Darfur**

Annex V treats an additional security crisis in Darfur that goes almost completely unspoken: the continuing epidemic of sexual violence against women and girls throughout Darfur. So consistent and detailed are the reports from Radio Dabanga, so painfully compelling in their authority, that some rendering of their larger implications seems essential. Annex V presents a relatively recent overview of reports and a bibliography of studies of rape in Darfur, as well as a large compendium of reported incidents, which occur in or near camps, in rural areas, and near towns.

**Humanitarian conditions**

Khartoum’s March 2009 expulsion of thirteen distinguished international humanitarian organizations has received insufficient attention, largely out of fear that more expulsions and a greater reduction of humanitarian capacity would follow. But UN and other sources have repeatedly—if confidentially—confirmed that approximately half the humanitarian capacity was lost at the time and has never been recovered. Indeed, recent evidence suggests that in addition to subsequent expulsions, as well as withdrawals by important relief organizations, overall humanitarian access has been drastically curtailed by regime restrictions and insecurity either orchestrated or sanctioned by the regime.
This evidence has not prevented disingenuousness on the part of UN humanitarian officials, especially former Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Sudan Georg Charpentier. Charpentier silenced subordinates, submitted to all Khartoum’s demands, yet still claimed publicly that “UN humanitarian agencies are not confronted by pressure or interference from the Government of Sudan”—despite massive evidence to the contrary. This occurred as both UNAMID and humanitarian agencies were repeatedly denied access to many critical areas, including an almost total denial of humanitarian access to the populous Jebel Marra region of central Darfur.

The realities of the humanitarian situation in Darfur are represented at considerable length in Annex IV as well as in the more extensive analyses of Section One. Collectively they reveal a strategy I have called “genocide by attrition,” one of deliberate infliction “on the [non-Arab/African tribal groups of Darfur] conditions of life calculated to bring about [their] physical destruction in whole or in part” (language from the 1948 UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide). There are entirely too many indications that the assault on “conditions of life” for displaced Darfuris will continue indefinitely.

Looking back over more than eight years of international responses to human suffering and destruction in Darfur, it is impossible not to conclude that the notion of a “responsibility to protect” civilians unprotected or endangered by their own government has proved completely meaningless, despite the solemn and unanimous acceptance of this responsibility at the UN World Summit of September 2005. Darfur represents precisely the type of assault on civilians that the “responsibility to protect” was meant to halt. Instead, the belatedly deployed international security force failed due to its unwillingness to confront the Khartoum regime; as a direct consequence, humanitarian conditions continue to deteriorate. Almost as if to underscore the scale of failure in Darfur, there is little evidence that any form of international action will halt Khartoum’s ongoing military assaults on the civilian populations of the Nuba Mountains of South Kordofan and Blue Nile, or that the international community will secure humanitarian access for the many hundreds of thousands of people slowly starving to death in these regions.

**Eastern Chad**

The UN High Commission for Refugees estimates that 288,000 Darfuris continue to live as refugees in eastern Chad, where they experience relatively stable, if deeply impoverished conditions. They are, however, terrified to return to Darfur because of rampant insecurity and the seizure of many lands and farms by Arab militia forces. These refugees are the most invisible of Darfur’s victims; their situa-
tion has gone virtually unreported for the past five years. The vast majority fled in the war’s early years and have thus endured refugee life for as long as nine years. There are frequent reports of violence—including rape—in these twelve Chadian camps, and security could quickly become untenable, depending on political events in N’Djamena and the fate of President Idriss Déby, who achieved a political rapprochement with Khartoum in 2007.

Before this mutual survival pact, the two regimes fought a vicious proxy war along the Chad/Darfur border. Déby, a Zaghawa, supported the Zaghawa-dominated Justice and Equality Movement in Darfur, and Khartoum encouraged its Janjaweed militia to pursue Darfuris into eastern Chad, going so far as to extend its genocidal counter-insurgency into the region. Several reports from Human Rights Watch chronicle in compelling detail the nature of this brutal extension of Khartoum’s war on non-Arab civilians:

“Darfur Bleeds: Recent Cross-Border Violence in Chad” (February 2006)

“‘They Came Here to Kill Us’: Militia Attacks and Ethnic Targeting of Civilians in Eastern Chad” (January 2007)

Given the earlier failure of the 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement (Abuja, Nigeria), rapprochement between N’Djamena and Khartoum set the stage not only for ongoing competition for weapons, but also for fighting among increasingly fractious non-signatory rebel groups. This fissuring process is described in detail by Victor Tanner and Jérôme Tubiana in “Divided they Fall: The Fragmentation of Darfur’s Rebel Groups” (Small Arms Survey, July 2007). Here again it is important to recognize the ways in which Khartoum exploited rebel divisions and encouraged the growth of random violence, aptly characterized by Human Rights Watch as “chaos by design.”

Annex VI offers an overview of violence and humanitarian conditions in eastern Chad from 2007 to the present.

The Collapse of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA)

The 2005 CPA marks a moment of historic significance for a country at war with itself since gaining independence in 1956. Should this agreement unravel—for there are many unresolved issues and points of contention between Juba and Khartoum—war seems inevitable. Indeed, the provisions of the CPA still unfulfilled by Khartoum have already occasioned very serious fighting along the border, beginning with the regime’s military seizure of Abyei in May 2011. Although the CPA was a major diplomatic achievement for the Bush administration, senior officials failed to
follow through with sufficiently aggressive efforts to secure implementation of the various CPA protocols—thus ensuring that Southern secession (July 2011) would occasion increasing confrontation rather than peaceful co-existence.

The CPA comprises six protocols that address self-determination for the South (the landmark “Machakos Protocol” of July 2002), security issues, wealth- and power-sharing, border delineation and demarcation, the status of Abyei (including a self-determination referendum), and political arrangements to resolve conflict and political grievances in South Kordofan and Blue Nile. It should be noted that the “Comprehensive” Peace Agreement that culminated the Naivasha (Kenya) peace process, while consolidating all the Protocols, was not a “comprehensive” peace for all of Sudan; rather it was a bilateral arrangement between the Khartoum regime and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement.

Subsequent peace agreements between Khartoum and one of the rebel factions (Abuja, 2006) and between Khartoum and the rebels of the Eastern Front in Red Sea, Kassala, Gedarif states (fall 2006) were abrogated almost immediately by the regime. They brought neither peace nor the promised development assistance nor any improvement in humanitarian conditions. These failed agreements with northern insurgencies cast a long shadow over the possibility of a successful outcome for the CPA.

Almost from the moment the CPA was signed there were indications that Khartoum did not intend to abide by the agreement’s key protocols. The security protocol, arguably the most important breakthrough in the Naivasha negotiations leading to the signing of the CPA, was never meaningfully implemented. The Joint Integrated Units (comprising Sudan Armed Forces battalions and SPLA units) failed from the beginning of deployment; they were to have formed the basis of the national army in the event Sudan remain unified. SAF officers refused to accept the SPLA as equal partners, and the forces were segregated in barracks, training, and patrolling. This fragmentation should have elicited serious concern from the international community, but by this point interest in Sudan had already begun to wane.

A key event in the early months following the CPA’s signing was the death of John Garang in a helicopter crash on July 30, 2005—an incident never satisfactorily explained. With the death of Garang, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement lost a charismatic leader with wide international recognition and powerful negotiating skills. His death likely ended any chance that Khartoum would feel sufficient pressure to fulfill its obligations under the CPA. Garang’s successor as president of the Government of South Sudan (GOSS) was long-time SPLM/A commander Salva Kiir. In the eyes of many Southerners, Salva was a conciliatory figure: he had little of Garang’s autocratic manner and offered the promise of reducing ten-
sions within the SPLA/M and among Southerners more generally. But he also lacks the dynamism and visionary abilities that enabled Garang to hold the SPLA/M together through more than twenty years of civil war. Salva inherited a job that was by nature impossible, and he has been let down by many around him. The massive corruption scandal that erupted publicly in 2012 revealed just how little control the GOSS leadership had over its various resources, including financial resources.

Over the past seven years, Salva has proved to be dutiful, hardworking, and a man of considerable integrity amidst the corruption scandals that have plagued the South since the beginning of the Interim Period. Yet although his political skills have improved while in office, and his general instincts have remained sharp, there have been diplomatic missteps, especially in the relationship with the U.S. The absence of Garang’s leadership has at times been sorely felt. It is difficult to judge any leader confronted by a foe as implacable as the Khartoum regime—much less in the wake of the loss of someone as gifted as Garang. Still, it is far from clear that events would ultimately have been different had Garang survived. The task of full CPA implementation was likely impossible for anyone.

It must also be said that the nascent GOSS made several troubling decisions and appointments. One particularly telling example was the re-appointment of Dak Dop Bishok as Governor of Upper Nile. Those familiar with the ferociously destructive history of Upper Nile, including humanitarian workers, regarded Dak Dop Bishok as little more than one of the region’s many vicious warlords. He deliberately refused to respond to the deadly attacks on the Shilluk people of Upper Nile in early 2004, which were encouraged by Khartoum and generated large-scale displacement, creating a significant humanitarian crisis in the region. Dak Dop Bishok possessed none of the political skills necessary to oversee the difficult transition period in Upper Nile. Ethnic tensions have continued to run high in some places in the region and from late 2011 into 2012 led to extremely serious violence between the Lou Nuer and Murle tribal groups, particularly in Jonglei.

Command-and-control within the SPLA was also an inevitable problem for the South. This is hardly surprising given the poor communications available and the loose chain of command that often defined SPLA guerrilla actions. More troublingly, most SPLA troops had little formal education and almost no training in the rule of law or human rights obligations. Although hardly surprising in a guerrilla force seeking to become a disciplined national army, this remains a very serious concern. Arbitrary arrests, harassment of journalists, theft, as well as drunkenness and indiscriminate weapons-fire have been persistent problems within an army that is far too large and expensive, commandeering as it does a disproportionate percentage of the national budget. An excessively rapid demobilizing of these soldiers, however, could create recruiting opportunities for renegade militia groups in
the South that are funded by Khartoum. Many have no skills apart from military ones.

Certainly Khartoum’s continuing support for renegade militia groups has made the South much more difficult to govern in recent years. These militias—armed, supplied, paid, and often provided sanctuary by Khartoum—have caused extraordinary civilian suffering, displacement, and destruction. George Athor (now dead), Peter Gadet (before provisionally re-defecting to Juba), Johnson Olonyi, David Yau Yau—these and other militia figures and their weapons have been carefully tracked by the Small Arms Survey (Geneva), with results that provide overwhelming circumstantial evidence of Khartoum’s support for the militia groups. The SPLA actually captured in Upper Nile one of Khartoum’s helicopters flying men from George Athor’s militia to northern Sudan (the capture was the result of a navigational error by a Russian pilot, one of many foreign mercenaries employed by Khartoum). There could be no more conspicuous evidence of the NIF/NCP’s support for these brutally destructive militias in the South.

On September 24, 2012 the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) confirmed that one of Khartoum’s Antonov cargo planes—illegally painted “UN White”—was spotted dropping supplies in Jonglei in an area where David Yau Yau has been especially active and threatening to civilian security. This occurred even as Presidents Salva Kiir and Omar al-Bashir were attending a crucial summit dealing inter alia with security issues on both sides of the border.

Another signal event occurred in the middle of the Interim Period, May 2008. In a prelude to the events of May 2011, Khartoum’s regular forces and Misseriya (Arab) militia allies burned Abyei town to the ground, destroying most of the buildings and sending tens of thousands of Dinka Ngok residents fleeing to Agok in South Sudan (Warrap State). Despite this flagrant violation of the CPA, Khartoum faced no meaningful sanction or even condemnation from the international community. The lack of a response to the May 2008 events was surely in Khartoum’s mind when its forces again burned down Abyei town during the militarily seizure of the Abyei region in May 2011. Roger Winter offers a contemporaneous account of what occurred in the May 2008 assault. Without assistance from the UNMIS contingent on the ground, Winter traveled directly into Abyei town:

It was empty. You could look the full length of streets and see no one. I counted only 10-12 civilians, several of whom appeared to be mentally unstable. The others, sneaking back to where their homes once stood, were evidently attempting to salvage any remaining blankets or belongings. The market had been looted and burned to the ground. Many structures were still smoldering. Block after block of traditional
homes were reduced to ashes. Approximately 25 percent of the towns structures were totally destroyed. Shortly after our visit, we received reliable reports that most of the rest was aflame. Abyei, as it had existed several days earlier, had ceased to exist.30

Photographic evidence accompanies this account, as it again did in the May 2011 destruction of Abyei town. (See photographs following Section Three.)

The 2008 destruction of Abyei town brought Sudan and South Sudan to the brink of war. Despite the extraordinary dangers of renewed conflict, the weakness of response by the Bush administration stood in sharp contrast with the words of then-special envoy for Sudan Richard Williamson: “This process of improving the bilateral relationship [between Washington and Khartoum] will end if new violence is initiated in or by Sudan. For example, the bilateral relationship will not improve if violence escalates in Abyei or Chad.” Experience has shown that threats made without a meaningful follow-through only encourage Khartoum to believe that it will never face serious international sanction for its actions. This fundamental lesson in engaging with the present regime seems almost entirely lost on the international diplomatic community.

By the end of the “Interim Period” (January 9, 2005 to July 9, 2011), Salva Kiir, the GOSS leadership, and the South more generally had become aware that international efforts, especially on the part of the U.S. and to a lesser degree the European Union, had become exclusively focused on securing a Southern self-determination referendum and an orderly secession. The timely convening of this referendum was regarded as the indispensable component of the CPA. Everything else—including the Abyei self-determination referendum and Darfur and Khartoum’s continued aerial bombardment of Southern territory—was ignored in the effort to secure the referendum for the South. The reasoning was that if the referendum did not occur, resumed war was inevitable. Overlooked, however, were the ways in which Khartoum could trigger war through the abrogation of other key parts of the CPA, such as the delineation and demarcation of the increasingly contested North/South border, Abyei, oil revenue-sharing, and political justice for the northern border regions of South Kordofan and Blue Nile.

The deferment of the issue of citizenship for “Southerners” in Sudan after independence also had dismaying consequences. “Southerners”—meaning anyone of South Sudanese ethnic background—were stripped of their citizenship almost immediately following Southern independence, even if they had been born in the north, knew no languages of the South (other than Arabic), and possessed no family or land to return to. Hostility to those perceived as Southern has steadily increased since secession, often in the form of intimidation, harassment, and violence directed
against Christian churches and worshippers. Christianity is viewed as “Southern,” and Christians must confront President al-Bashir’s determination to impose a new constitution on Sudan based entirely on a strict and often cruel version of sharia (Islamic law). Hudud provisions in the penal code provide for crucifixion, stoning to death for female “adulteresses,” and cross-amputation (cutting off the right forearm and left lower leg) for stealing. Al-Bashir justifies this imposition of sharia with the erroneous claim that 98 percent of the north is Muslim. This is highly inaccurate, not only in light of the Christian populations in more northerly states but also because of the very significant percentage of Christians in South Kordofan and Blue Nile.

Wealth-sharing from oil revenues was also ignored by those who had invested most in securing the CPA. Countries no longer providing committed diplomacy included not only the East African consortium of countries known as IGAD (Intergovernmental Authority for Development), but also the African Union and other countries in the “Friends of IGAD” diplomatic group, including Canada and Italy. Without U.S., European, or African Union support, Juba was left on its own to contend with Khartoum’s bookkeeping manipulations, which understated production and revenues in ways that likely cost South Sudan billions of dollars. A full accounting will almost certainly never be rendered; indeed, against the spirit of the CPA, the NIF/NCP denied the SPLM both the Finance Ministry and the Ministry for Mining and Energy. This ensured that there would be no Southern participation in the oversight of oil revenue and production numbers. Even so, the South offered in July 2012 to “forgive” the amount of oil revenues it calculated Khartoum sequestered between January 9, 2005 and July 9, 2011.

Although international support for John Garang’s powerful vision of a “New Sudan”—one based on citizenship and recognizing the country’s profound diversity—was essential, there was widespread refusal to accept Garang’s parallel conviction that Khartoum would have to “make unity attractive” to Southerners if a united Sudan were to be preserved. My own sense from private conversations with “Dr. John” is that he was immensely skeptical Khartoum would do the work required to make unity attractive, but that if international commitment was to be secured in support of any negotiated peace, it was essential that this be the ostensible goal, thus putting the burden of proof squarely on Khartoum.

It was clear from the beginning, however, that Khartoum had no intention of making unity attractive. Southerners in Khartoum participating politically in the “Government of National Unity” found themselves almost completely marginalized. Shadow ministries appeared that made decisions and created policies intended to be the work of official ministries. Meetings were frequently held in extremely
rapid and idiomatic northern Sudanese Arabic, which effectively excluded Southerners from many discussions, even those fluent in “Juba Arabic.”

No plans were made for the “popular consultations” promised to South Kordofan and Blue Nile by the CPA. At the same time, al-Bashir and his NIF/NCP associates made clear their contempt for the findings of the Abyei Boundaries Commission, which was stipulated in the Abyei Protocol and had submitted a comprehensive report on Abyei’s boundaries in July 2005. Critically, no real progress was made on either delineation or demarcation of the borders. Abyei in particular was an issue on which the international community failed badly and which has now become an explosive point of contention between Juba and Khartoum. As early as 2006 it was clear that Khartoum was intent on preventing even the formation of a commission to establish the North/South boundary in crucial oil production areas.  

National elections planned for 2009 received woefully inadequate support from the international community and were pushed back to 2010; an accompanying census for voter registration had little credibility. When elections finally occurred, they were an electoral travesty, notwithstanding the promise of U.S. special envoy Scott Gration that elections “would be as free and fair as possible.” Khartoum rigged the elections in a range of ways, chronicled here in Annex X. By this point the leadership in Juba had concluded that the NIF/NCP regime was not interested in either electoral fairness or concessions that might contribute to “making unity attractive.” Although elections in South Sudan were hardly a model of democratic fairness, their results were not significantly affected by the heavy-handed methods of individuals within the SPLM. In any event, all Southern eyes were on the self-determination referendum that was at this point only months away. The results of that vote were predictable and entirely representative of Southern sentiment: some 99 percent voted for secession.

Khartoum’s leaders, accepting the inevitable, decided that they would concede the referendum, but only to the South, not Abyei. Nor would they make any movement to give voice to the deep grievances of those in Blue Nile and South Kordofan. Indeed, perhaps the best measure of Khartoum’s view of the situation was its decision to resume aerial bombardment of Southern territory. Beginning in November 2010 and continuing to the present, more than 70 aerial attacks on civilians in the South have been confirmed—some directed at refugee camps.

Many in the regime in Khartoum never fully accepted the CPA, or saw it as an ignominious military concession. By spring of 2011 these men, several of them senior generals in the military, had effectively seized control of political power and key decisions concerning war and peace. The history leading up to this shift and its consequences is the subject of the third section of this text.
“The Hour of the Soldiers”

In a dispatch that has received too little attention from those who fashion Sudan policy, seasoned Sudan observer Julie Flint reports (August 2, 2011):

A source close to the NCP reports that Sudan’s two most powerful generals went to Bashir on May 5 [2011], five days after 11 soldiers were killed in an SPLA ambush in Abyei, on South Kordofan’s southwestern border, and demanded powers to act as they sought fit, without reference to the political leadership. “They got it,” the source says. “It is the hour of the soldiers—a vengeful, bitter attitude of defending one’s interests no matter what; a punitive and emotional approach that goes beyond calculation of self-interest. The army was the first to accept that Sudan would be partitioned. But they also felt it as a humiliation, primarily because they were withdrawing from territory in which they had not been defeated. They were ready to go along with the politicians as long as the politicians were delivering—but they had come to the conclusion they weren’t. Ambushes in Abyei... interminable talks in Doha keeping Darfur as an open wound...Lack of agreement on oil revenues...It has gone beyond politics,” says one of Bashirs closest aides. “It is about dignity.”

There is much to be said by way of qualification here, but events following early May 2011 seem to validate Flint’s basic claim. The seizure of Abyei by SAF forces and Misseriya militia allies on May 21 was simply the final move in military advances that had been conspicuous and publicly reported since January 2011. But as Flint notes, there was much bitterness in the army over the terms of the CPA. In the end it was not surprising that political power, especially in decisions about war and peace, was demanded by soldiers like Lt. Gen. Ismat Abdel Rahman al-Zain and Major General Mahjoub Abdallah Sharfi, the men who confronted al-Bashir over Abyei.

If we are to understand such events in Sudan—especially military events—from May 2011 to the present, then we require a full and detailed organization of key developments over time. Annex I attempts to provide such a timeline, which includes all significant political, diplomatic, military, and humanitarian events for this period.

If there is a terminus a quo for this third section, and for most of the timeline in Annex I, it is November 2010. It was at this point that Khartoum resumed aerial bombardment of South Sudan and the U.S. signaled that it would try to compel
Juba to compromise for a third time on the final resolution of the issue of Abyei’s boundaries. The causal connection here is not straightforward, but there can be little doubt that Khartoum sensed the Obama administration’s desire to end diplomatic expenditures in the cause of a just peace for all of Sudan. Such expediency was also signaled by the Obama administration decision—publicly announced by a “senior administration official”—that Darfur was being “de-coupled” from the largest bilateral issue between Khartoum and Washington: the regime’s continuing presence on the State Department list of state sponsors of terrorism. This came on the heels of an enthusiastic U.S. endorsement of Khartoum’s ruthless “New Strategy for Darfur,” which was little more than a means of pressuring for humanitarian withdrawal and compelling the return of displaced persons.

What did Khartoum hope to gain by resuming its bombing of South Sudan? One reason may have been a growing need to exercise political and diplomatic power through military means, this in order to convince Juba to be more accommodating in negotiations over those issues still outstanding after January 9, 2011. Certainly those who ordered the bombings knew that such acts were provocative in the extreme and could only breed mistrust in Juba. From this, one might conclude that the aerial attacks were intended to provoke a return to war or at least a military misstep by the SLPA; in fact, Juba showed remarkable military restraint through July 2011 in spite of relentless provocations. We cannot be entirely sure of the motivation for these actions, although they have been authoritatively established. What is certain—and certainly not lost on Khartoum—is that there has been no consequential international condemnation of what would soon be the sovereign territory of South Sudan. The bombings have continued with virtually complete impunity, occasioning only perfunctory condemnations by the U.S. and EU, and virtually no response from the AU.

A partial roster of these attacks forms a revealing backdrop to a period in which Juba was urged to surrender even more of Abyei as the price for the South’s own self-determination referendum. Three attacks, with sixteen casualties, on Kiir Adem in Aweil County North, Northern Bahr el-Ghazal (November 2010); three attacks in Raja County, Western Bahr el-Ghazal (December 2010); Timsaha in Raja County was attacked again on January 10, 2011, the day following South Sudan’s self-determination referendum; and Upuranus, Firka, Raja, and Timsaha—again in Raja County—were all bombed on March 21, 2011. The pattern continues, with increasing attacks against Upper Nile and Unity states, including the November 8, 2011 attack on a refugee camp near Guffa in Upper Nile and the November 10, 2011 attack on Yida refugee camp (Unity State).

The most compelling evidence of a military takeover in decision-making was the peculiar history of the so-called “Framework Agreement” negotiated by a senior
NIF/NCP official, Nafie Ali Nafie, and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army-North of Abdel Aziz al-Hilu. The agreement, signed on June 28, 2011, addressed some of the issues that had precipitated the crisis in South Kordofan and committed both parties to seek a cessation of hostilities. In a striking reversal, Omar al-Bashir renounced this agreement three days later on returning from his visit to China. During evening prayers on Friday July 1, al-Bashir declared that the SAF would “continue their military operations in South Kordofan until a cleansing of the region is over.”

Nafie would certainly have never signed such a consequential agreement without confirmation from al-Bashir. Something in the changed political environment was responsible for such a precipitous shift. Either the SAF leadership demanded that the agreement be renounced, or al-Bashir was seeking an opportunity to undermine his closest—and thus most dangerous—hard-line ally; Nafie’s profile diminished significantly following the episode. Since then, the military campaign in South Kordofan has continued with undiminished savagery against civilians. At the same time, the SAF has been militarily defeated by Abdel Aziz’s relentless forces. Photographs of captured equipment, detailed ground reports, and assessments from other regional sources and U.S. government officials all show a Northern military force outmaneuvered and out-fought by the highly motivated SPLA-N. Indeed, morale is a fundamental problem in the SAF, especially among its African conscripts. At one point in summer 2011, two full battalions were reported to have deserted rather than fight the SPLA-N; this likely explains Khartoum’s increased use of Popular Defense Force (PDF) troops and proxy Arab militia forces.

While military developments were unfolding throughout 2011 into 2012, the economy of Sudan had begun to implode. It is too early in August 2012 to say whether the initial efforts to create an “Arab Spring” in Sudan will overcome the brutally repressive tactics of a regime now in full survivalist mode, but the economic impetus to the uprising will certainly grow. The secession of South Sudan meant that Khartoum lost 75 percent of known oil reserves. Yet rather than negotiate a reasonable transit fee arrangement for Southern oil to be shipped north (the only present outlet for oil is Port Sudan on the Red Sea), Khartoum insisted on a fee of $36/barrel—a rate unheard of in any other comparable oil transit arrangement in the world. Khartoum had long diverted oil revenues due to the South under the wealth-sharing protocol, and in summer 2011 began to sequester oil openly, depriving the South of some $800 million in revenue. These funds were appropriated on the basis of the unilaterally imposed rate of $36/barrel.

By January 2012 Khartoum’s refusal to compromise compelled Juba to shut down all its oil production facilities. Although the shutdown deprived the South of approximately 98 percent of its export income—thus creating an economically
destabilizing loss of international hard currency—in many ways it had a more devastat ing effect on Khartoum and the better integrated economy of Sudan. Inflation began to spiral, and by July 2012 the real rate of inflation exceeded 50 percent. Increases in food prices, which had long been subsidized, were the immediate spark for the uprising, and the general inflation rate promised to move relentlessly higher. The regime lacked a way to close an enormous budget gap beyond turning on the printing presses and creating ever-greater inflation. The value of the Sudanese pound has continued to plummet, foreign exchange reserves have been largely exhausted, and no short-term fixes are available. Indeed, although the regime had initially proposed to remove costly fuel subsidies, they deferred doing so for at least a year because of demonstrations that had spread to a number of cities in Sudan. On July 31 Khartoum’s security forces, using automatic weapons, killed thirteen students and wounded scores more in Nyala (South Darfur) during a peaceful demonstration. This may well be a turning point in Sudan’s history, the moment in which fear of a ruthless regime turned to anger at its unbridled and cruel tyranny.

Khartoum evidently believed—with some justification—that it could play a game of brinksmanship on the issue of oil revenues without risking a Southern production shutdown. Furthermore, the regime believed that the international community, which had invested so much in South Sudan, would push Juba to make a deal—any deal—rather than see Juba cut off its only real source of export income. As it turned out, these actions led Khartoum over the brink without a safety net; rather than finding an international community willing to compel Juba to yield, it instead encountered fierce Southern determination not to capitulate. Tensions escalated sharply, and serious ground fighting in April 2012 brought the two armies perilously close to war following Khartoum’s second offensive against an SPLA military base near Tishwin (Unity State). For much of 2011 through 2012 Khartoum has been guided by the assumptions that the Southern economy would collapse, hyper-inflation would destroy Juba’s ability to buy food and fuel, and civil unrest would de-stabilize the country. No doubt the NIF/NCP also calculated that Juba would be unable to pay its hugely expensive armed forces, causing desertions and defections to Khartoum-backed militias.

Hyper-inflation, a real threat in the South, poses even greater dangers for the economy of the north. Import businesses have ground to a halt; key imports of parts, tools, equipment, and other commercially critical supplies have become impossibly expensive. The regime has had to curtail the financing of its vast political patronage system at the very moment when it most needs political support. And within the current budgetary framework there is no way for the military forces (including the Popular Defense Forces and other militia forces) to be paid in full, or kept in the
field on multiple fronts: Darfur, South Kordofan, Blue Nile, and other areas in which the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF) may choose to attack.

Much of the recent upsurge in violence throughout Darfur seems to be a function of Khartoum’s ending previous payments to the Janjaweed and other militia forces. In addition to cash salaries, these “payments” often took the form of land appropriated from displaced African tribal groups and booty that was seized following the destruction of villages. After more than nine years of genocidal counter-insurgency, however, there is very little arable or pasturable land left with which to recruit and retain militia forces. Thousands of villages have been destroyed and completely looted—one reason why IDP camps are subject to greatly increased violence, including extortion schemes. Some form of this dynamic seems to underlie most of the violence in the greater Kutum area in August 2012. Khartoum has created a situation that it no longer fully controls, as revealed by recent fighting between the SAF and previously allied militia forces.

Despite the growing vulnerability of the Khartoum regime in the wake of these deepening economic woes, the international community has failed to secure humanitarian access to the Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile from Khartoum. Hundreds of thousands of civilians are on the verge of starvation, and many are already dying. The evidence from the refugee camps in Unity and Upper Nile states in South Sudan is compelling: we can be sure that the emergency threshold for Global Acute Malnutrition (GAM) is greatly exceeded in most locations in the Nuba and Blue Nile. Moreover, relentless bombing attacks have ensured that these regions missed a second consecutive planting season, which in turn has eliminated the possibility of a fall harvest. Mass starvation is imminent.

Those attempting to flee now are badly hampered by the heaviest part of seasonal rains. In June 2012 Doctors Without Borders/Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) estimated that 4,000 people per day were fleeing as refugees to Southern camps. 40 We have no reliable numbers for continuing refugee moments, but they are certainly very large—even as the trek to South Sudan is increasingly arduous. Many simply cannot make the journey, and those who do often arrive badly dehydrated and severely malnourished. By the end of July MSF was reporting appalling levels of child mortality from diarrheal diseases and malnutrition. In Yida camp MSF reported a Crude Mortality Rate (CMR) for children of “at least two a day” from such causes (CMR measures deaths per day per 10,000 of population). 44 percent of children under two years old were reported as malnourished, a staggering 18 percent of them with Severe Acute Malnutrition (SAM); SAM typically kills a very large percentage of its victims. These numbers were the case despite the population’s access to significant—if insufficient—humanitarian resources.
Overall the CMR for camp populations is rising and will only get worse. In the words of one humanitarian relief worker, “It’s going to get worse. July is worse than June, and August is going to be worse than July.” And at the end of July, MSF announced that “new epidemiological data from two refugee camps in South Sudan show mortality and malnutrition rates soaring above emergency thresholds.” Bart Janssens, MSF Operations Director, reported that:

The rainy season has turned these camps into nightmare places to be a refugee. The access roads are disintegrating and the humanitarian response is struggling to provide conditions where people can live. This is causing a catastrophic health situation, and while MSF can continue to provide treatment, a huge increase of capacity of humanitarian actors is needed now to avoid a lot more children becoming life-threateningly ill. Especially in water and sanitation since diarrhoea is the major killer in the camps and also for targeted food distribution in Batil where the malnutrition is so far above emergency thresholds. The situation requires all organisations to work in full emergency mode now.  

Transportation issues have grown critical and in many cases are now insurmountable. Provision of adequate clean water has also encountered fundamental logistical problems.

The engine of displacement driving these people to flee continues to race with no adequate international response. There is no food or primary medical care in the afflicted regions of Blue Nile and the Nuba, nor any realistic prospect of significantly increased humanitarian access, despite the willingness of the SPLA/M-North to declare a one-month cease-fire to permit humanitarian delivery by neutral parties. Children, the elderly, and the infirm may die first, but they will soon be joined in large numbers by those who were formerly healthy and productive. To date tens of thousands have died, or will die soon; the question facing the international community is whether those with power will act before the count reaches the hundreds of thousands.

In the conclusion to these first sections I bring events up to the present (August 2012), surveying all three broad topics in an effort to articulate the largest patterns in this history and the most consistent tendencies of diplomacy. This is the necessary prelude to assigning responsibility for failure in those moments when the history of the past five years might have been changed. Darfur, South Kordofan, and Blue Nile are the most decisive examples to date of how the “Responsibility to Protect”—so enthusiastically endorsed by the UN in 2005—remains a doctrine that has yet to enter meaningfully into the world of international political action.
As of August 3, 2012 there are signs that a deal on oil revenues and transit fees has been struck by Khartoum and Juba in Addis Ababa. The deal is hedged in by several contingencies, including a resolution of “security issues” on Khartoum’s terms. In other words, Khartoum’s acceptance of the arrangement is a likely ploy to delay diplomacy—an all too familiar tactic (talks had not resumed as of the end of August). Unless there is a comprehensive resolution of all outstanding issues, the international attention that has narrowly focused on securing an oil deal may actually prove counter-productive.

The immediate and unqualified celebration of this highly contingent deal is a sign that these other key issues may indeed receive less diplomatic attention than is required. But Khartoum has made clear that before the oil deal can come into effect, “security issues” must be resolved in a way that the regime finds satisfactory. This means, among other things, removing the military threat in the Nuba Mountains posed by the Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement-North and, more broadly, the insurgency coalition known as the Sudan Revolutionary Front (including rebel groups from Darfur); this action is something Juba is neither willing nor able to undertake. Moreover, it is important to bear in mind that the Khartoum regime—both as the National Islamic Front and as the National Congress Party—has a long history of signing agreements with various Sudanese parties and refusing to abide by them. Indeed, it has never abided by any such agreement—not one, not ever.

This history of bad faith should temper optimism about what AU mediators led by Thabo Mbeki have actually achieved. Additionally, there are a raft of issues that threaten any agreement between Khartoum and Juba regarding oil: citizenship or residency status for “Southerners” in Sudan, border delineation and demarcation, creation of a demilitarized zone along the demarcated border, and above all, Darfur. Darfuri rebels, particularly the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), have joined with the SPLA/M-N to create the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF). There have been reports of significant fighting in both Darfur and South Kordofan between SAF troops and elements of the SRF.

The largest conclusion I develop in this final section is that the international community has failed Sudan because it refuses to accept the NIF/NCP regime for what it is. The Obama administration has been consistently trapped and rendered ineffective by untenable assumptions and the diplomatic actions of its special envoys, Major-General (ret.) Scott Gration and Princeton Lyman. Over the past three and a half years, these men have based U.S. policy on unsupportable conclusions: that peace would come to Darfur by the end of 2009, that the 2010 national elections would be as “free and fair” as possible, that Khartoum’s “New Strategy for Darfur” was something other than a roadmap for humanitarian expulsions and forced returns of displaced persons, and that the U.S. could not support change of the Khartoum
regime because the NIF/NCP was capable of overseeing democratic transformation of Sudan. Indeed, Princeton Lyman declared regarding this last point (March 2011): “Frankly, we do not want to see the ouster of the [Sudanese] regime, nor regime change. We want to see the regime carrying out reform via constitutional democratic measures.”

The same assumptions underlies Lyman’s August 1, 2012 address to the Michael Ansari Center of the Atlantic Council. In order for the relationship between Khartoum and the United States to improve, Lyman told his audience, the NIF/NCP regime would have to show itself ready to address the fundamental issues that have caused it such internal conflict and brought about such dire economic conditions. These are the basic issues of governance already being debated in the country. The government would show itself to be accountable, committed to democracy, to respect for human rights, and it would be moving to institutionalize these through a broadly based constitutional process, one that drew in the people from all over the country.

This statement ignores diplomatic realities, and credits the Khartoum regime with the potential ability to “address the fundamental issues that have caused it such internal conflict.” Moreover, to speak about the “basic issues of governance being debated in [Sudan]” and to pretend that the regime will ever be “committed to democracy” and “to respecting human rights”—all this on the basis of a “broadly based constitutional process”—is to suggest as possible what all historical evidence makes clear is anything but.

Events of the past year alone reveal this fundamental fact about the regime as inescapable truth. Within days of Lyman’s speech, a UN World Food Program worker was murdered in South Kordofan, almost certainly at the behest of Khartoum. On July 31, 2012 Khartoum’s security forces slaughtered students who were demonstrating in Nyala. In Khartoum and other major urban centers, regime security forces have brutally suppressed non-violent demonstrations, arresting and often torturing many hundreds of civilians. And in early August 2012 Khartoum-allied militias attacked and looted humanitarian centers (taking food and fuel) as well as IDP camps and markets in the Kutum area, destroying what they could not carry off and killing or wounding dozens. A similar attack, again killing or wounding dozens, is reliably reported to have occurred in the important market town of Tabit, only 30 kilometers south of el-Fasher on August 19. Aerial bombardment of civilians continues relentlessly in South Kordofan and Blue Nile, forcing hundreds of thousands of people to flee or face the growing likelihood of starvation. Seven
months after the UN, AU, and Arab League petitioned for humanitarian access to desperate civilians, Khartoum continues to refuse all such access. A great many people have died as a result of this cruel obduracy.

By postulating a “reformist” regime in Khartoum as possible, Lyman provides diplomatic cover for diplomatic “engagement” in which Khartoum need do no more than participate in endless negotiations. Even more dangerously, in the interests of supposedly even-handed diplomacy, the Obama administration—along with most of the international community—is content to point to accounts of equally “unhelpful” behavior on both sides in assessing the actions and commitments of Khartoum and Juba. In short, the Obama administration has settled for “moral equivalence” (see the Conclusion). By viewing Khartoum and Juba as equivalently responsible for violence and insecurity, violations of the CPA, and the lack of a good-faith negotiating posture, U.S. policy has effectively elided the fundamental fact of Khartoum’s wide-ranging atrocity crimes.

There is a strong echo of this moral equivalence in the policies and attitudes of the European Union, the United Nations, and the African Union. Other key actors are either silent—Japan, Canada, India, Brazil—or actively support Khartoum’s diplomatic positions—preeminently China, Russia, and the Arab League. It is hardly surprising that the leadership in Juba finds such moral equivalence deeply discouraging and unfair—or that Khartoum’s thinking is precisely the opposite. The regime sees the international community refusing to speak honestly or to assess moral and political equities fairly, and is encouraged to push even harder for its various demands, particularly that the SPLA/M-N be disarmed or neutralized and that the North/South border reflect the regime’s own peculiar cartography.

The only sustainable peace is a just peace, but the NIF/NCP has proved beyond a doubt that it is not interested in justice, despite Lyman’s claims. The vast majority of senior officials within this regime are complicit in some of the most brutal atrocity crimes of the past two decades; many will be indicted by the International Criminal Court, as President al-Bashir, South Kordofan governor Ahmed Haroun, and Defense Minister Abdel Rahim Mohamed Hussein already have been. Diplomats may be able to secure a signing ceremony from this regime, but it will inevitably go the way of all previous agreements: the regime will renounce or ignore it at the time and in the way that proves most expedient. Based on the history of international response, Khartoum can expect little resistance.

Moral equivalence is not even-handed diplomacy in the case of Sudan, nor is it warranted by any careful analysis of the facts at hand. Moral equivalence is nothing less than a compromise with evil, and the consequences of such compromises do most to define the history of greater Sudan over the past five years.
Notes

1 Some 500,000 have died in Darfur since early 2003 (see Annex III). For the South during the civil war, Millard Burr’s December 1998 estimate for mortality remains our most authoritative: 1.9 million in South Sudan and the Nuba. Extrapolating from Burr’s data and collating his with other data sources, it seems likely that more than 300,000 people lost their lives subsequent to the 1998 data Burr considered and before the cessation of hostilities agreement of October 2002. Notably, Burr’s figures do not include data for mortality in Blue Nile or the Eastern Front, where there was also substantial mortality. Nor does his study consider many hundreds of thousands who lost their lives during the first Sudanese civil war (1956 – 1972). These data argue, in aggregate, argue for a total figure well in excess of 3 million.

2 Small Arms Survey

3 Eric Reeves, “How Many Internally Displaced Persons are there in Darfur?” April 28, 2011.

4 Much controversy has attended the distinctions between tribal groups in Darfur, a good deal of it dismaying facile. Some scoff at the notion that “non-Arab” groups are “African,” since everyone in Darfur is ipso facto in Africa. This seems unhelpful in making sense of a broad, if labile ethnic divide that has been growing more intense since the Fur-Arab war of 1987. The war was, for a number of tribal groups, the beginning of increasingly radical self-identification as “Arab,” a development spurred by the murky but vehement ideology of the “Arab Gathering.” This self-identification as “Arab” entailed separating tribal ethnic identity from that of the non-Arab tribes of Darfur.

Complicating any discussion of ethnicity in Darfur is the fact that centuries of intermarriage make it difficult if not impossible for non-Darfuris to distinguish Darfuri tribal groups on the basis of skin color or physiognomic features. But the Fur, Massalit, Zaghawa and other “non-Arab” or “African” tribal groups—those on whom the genocidal attacks fell first and most heavily—have increasingly identified themselves as African, a process that accelerated dramatically following the outbreak of war in 2003. Those targeted by the violence, including rape, typically report that the Arab militia forces perpetrating these crimes used racist epithets: abid (roughly equivalent to the hateful English word “nigger”); zurga (roughly equivalent to “black” or “very black”); and Nuba (a generalized name for all Africans based on the African character of the people of the Nuba Mountains). The more insistent and vehement these verbal epithets became, the more decisively non-Arabs identified themselves as African.


11 AP, “UN concerned at fate of 7,000 missing Sudanese,” June 28, 2011.

12 UN Doc. A/CONF.183.9, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.


18 Confidential email to the author, received August 5, 2012.

19 IWPR, “UN Accused of Caving In to Khartoum Over Darfur,” January 7, 2011.


22 UNHCR, “2012 UNHCR country operations profile—Chad.”


24 UNMIS, “The background to Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement.”


27 SAS, Sudan/South Sudan Arms and Ammunition Tracing Desk.


33 Julie Flint, “the Nuba Mountains war isn’t going away,” The Daily Star (Lebanon), August 2, 2011.


38 Khartoum had not yet begun its assault on Blue Nile.


42 The SPLA/M-N first committed to the joint African Union, Arab League, United Nations proposal in February 2012.

43 Princeton Lyman, interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, March 12, 2011.

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Oure Cassoni refugee camp, eastern Chad (August 2007)  
The grief endured by the people of Darfur, South Sudan, and the marginalized regions of greater Sudan is unfathomable
Bombing in the Nuba Mountains, summer 2011
The indiscriminate aerial attacks on civilians and humanitarians throughout Sudan and South Sudan continues to be a signature feature of Khartoum’s conduct of war; no one is spared
Women and children leave Abyei, March 2, 2011

“Women and children flee Abyei town. Recent fighting between Arab militias and Abyei police have left over 100 dead, and rumors of an imminent attack on Abyei town by Arab militias and SAF have caused citizens of Abyei and surrounding villages to flee south en masse.” [The Dinka Ngok of Abyei had a much clearer sense of what was impending than the international community; on May 21, 2011, Abyei was seized in its entirety by Khartoum’s Sudan Armed Forces and Arab militia allies—ER]
Destruction of Um Bartumbu Grinding Mill in the Nuba Mountains, June 16, 2012

Um Bartumbu, South Kordofan was the site of one of the most destructive of recent military actions against civilian life in the Nuba Mountains; the photograph here is of a destroyed grinding mill for grain, primarily sorghum.
The terror of children in the midst of war and displacement is inconceivable

June 2012
Oure Cassoni refugee camp, eastern Chad (February 2006)

288,000 Darfuris remain in eastern Chad as refugees, too fearful to return to their homes and lands.