

# **COMPROMISING WITH EVIL**

AN ARCHIVAL HISTORY OF GREATER SUDAN, 2007 – 2012

## **Acronyms and Names**

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## ACRONYMS AND NAMES

### Humanitarian organizations and terms

#### *UN humanitarian organizations (and headquarters):*

**UNDP**—UN Development Program

**UNFAO**—UN Food and Agriculture Organization

**UNHCHR**—UN High Commission for Human Rights (Geneva)

**UNHCR**—UN High Commission for Refugees

**UNICEF**—UN International Children’s Emergency Fund

**UNOCHA**—UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (also **OCHA**)

**UNWFP**—UN World Food Program (Rome) (also **WFP**)

**UNWHO**—UN World Health Organization (also **WHO**)

#### *Nongovernmental humanitarian organizations:*

**ACF**—Action Against Hunger (*Action contre la faim*)

**AmC**—Amal Center for the Treatment of Victims of Torture, Violence (and rape)  
located in Nyala, South Darfur

**CRS**—Catholic Relief Services

**DCA**—Danish Church Aid

**GOAL**—Irish nongovernmental humanitarian organization

**ICRC**—International Committee of the Red Cross

**IRC**—International Rescue Committee

**Medair** (Switzerland)

**Médecins du Monde** (France)

**MC**—Mercy Corps

**MSF**—Doctors Without Borders/Médecins Sans Frontières; French, Spanish, and Dutch national sections have been most active in Sudan

**NPA**—Norwegian People’s Aid

**Oxfam**—UK and American sections have been most active in Sudan

**SC**—Save the Children; UK, American, and Swedish sections have been most active in Sudan

**SP**—Samaritan’s Purse

**Solidarités**—France

**SUDO**—Sudan Social Development Organization

*Other humanitarian agencies:*

**HAC**—Khartoum’s “Humanitarian Aid Commission,” which has been responsible for the bureaucratic obstruction, harassment, and compromising of humanitarian activities

**IOM**—International Organization for Migration (intergovernmental)

**USAID**—U.S. Agency for International Development (increasingly under the sway of the U.S. State Department)

*Key terms in humanitarian relief:*

**CMR**—Crude Mortality Rate, which measures deaths per day per 10,000 of population

**Diarrhea**—a complex set of diseases, which often prove fatal, especially in the young; key distinction between clear and bloody diarrhea.

**GAM**—Global Acute Malnutrition. Rates in excess of 15 percent constitute a “humanitarian emergency”

**IDP**—Internally Displaced Person

**MUAC**—Mid-upper arm circumference (a malnutrition indicator)

**SAM**—Severe Acute Malnutrition; in children this is life-threatening in the short term without therapeutic intervention

**Human rights, policy, and international justice organizations  
(and primary headquarters)**

**ACJPS**—African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (London)

**AI**—Amnesty International (London)

**CC**—Carter Center (Atlanta)  
**HRF**—Human Rights First (New York)  
**HRW**—Human Rights Watch (New York)  
**ICC**—International Criminal Court (The Hague), based on **Rome Statute (1998)**  
**ICG**—International Crisis Group (Brussels)  
**Justice Africa** (London)  
**OMCT**—World Organization Against Torture  
**Pax Christi International** (Brussels)  
**PCA**—Permanent Court of Arbitration (The Hague)  
**PHR**—Physicians for Human Rights (Cambridge, MA)  
**RI**—Refugees International (Washington)  
**RVI**—Rift Valley Institute (Nairobi)  
**SAS**—Small Arms Survey (Geneva)  
**SOAT**—Sudan Organization Against Torture

**A brief selection of locations in Sudan and the region  
(see map section of bibliography)**

**1956 border**—the border between North and South as it existed on January 1, 1956, the day of Sudan’s independence from Anglo-Egyptian condominium rule; the CPA stipulates the 1956 border as the final determinant of the boundary between Sudan and South Sudan

**Abyei town**—the major town in Abyei; burned to the ground in May 2008 and May 2011

**Abyei**—contested area along the North/South border; Khartoum prevented the self-determination referendum scheduled for January 2011 per the terms of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement

**Addis Ababa**—capital of Ethiopia and headquarters for the African Union

**Agok**—town in Warrap State, close to the North/South border; most refugees from Abyei flee to Agok in May 2008 and again in May 2011

**Bentiu**—capital of Unity State; heavily bombed in April 2012

**Blue Nile**—northern state with a large population that identifies itself with South Sudan

- Doro, al-Jamam, and Jahlak**—refugee camps within Upper Nile
- El-Fasher**—capital of North Darfur; site of largest military base in Darfur
- El-Geneina**—capital of West Darfur
- Heglig/Panthou**—contested oil production site on the North/South border
- Jau (Jaw)**—town on the North/South border region; ethnically defined by the presence of the Dinka Panarou
- Jebel Marra**—the mountainous plateau straddling North, South, and West Darfur
- Juba**—capital of South Sudan; a major garrison town for Khartoum during the civil war
- Kadugli**—capital of South Kordofan
- Kafia Kingi**—a large enclave in Western Bahr el-Ghazal, appropriated into the north by Khartoum in 1960. Although all maps clearly indicate that the enclave belongs to South Sudan, it has nonetheless been a point of military tension for many months.
- Kauda**—the center of the Nuba Mountains
- Khartoum**—capital of (northern) Sudan. Located at the convergence of the Blue and White Nile Rivers
- Kiir Adem**—important town in Northern Bahr el-Ghazal; threatened by SAF in January 2012; bombed in November 2010 (confirmed by Associated Press)
- Kurmuk**—major town in southern Blue Nile; the last bastion of SPLA-N before it fell to Khartoum’s SAF in November 2011
- N’Djamena**—capital of Chad
- Omdurman**—twin city to Khartoum, lying west of the Nile; Sudan’s largest city
- Nuba Mountains**—in the center of South Kordofan
- Nyala**—capital of South Darfur and the most populous city in Darfur
- River Kiir/Bahr el-Arab**—meandering river that roughly defines most of the North/South border
- South Kordofan**—northern state with a large population that identifies itself with South Sudan
- Tishwin**—location of major SPLA garrison in Unity State
- Unity State**—oil-rich border state in South Sudan; many refugees from the Nuba have fled to camps in Unity State

**Upper Nile**—oil-rich border state in South Sudan; many refugees from Blue Nile have fled to camps in Upper Nile

**Yafta and Guffa**—locations within Upper Nile bombed on November 8, 2012

**Yei**—town in Central Equatoria repeatedly and notoriously bombed by Khartoum, including its hospital and cathedral

**Yida**—site of refugee camp in Unity State; the camp was bombed by Khartoum on November 10, 2011

### News sources used most frequently

**AC**—*Africa Confidential*; perhaps the single most authoritative source for background information on Sudan

**AFP**—Agence France-Presse; very good general source

**Al-Jazeera** (English)—intrepid reporters, and many extremely revealing dispatches

**AP**—Associated Press; much excellent work

**Bloomberg**—very reliable

**Daily Star** (Lebanon)—excellent op/ed page

**The Guardian** (UK)

**IWPR**—Institute for War and Peace Reporting (The Hague); excellent longer dispatches

**Los Angeles Times**

**McClatchey**—excellent work, though increasingly with an anti-Juba bias

**NYT**—*New York Times*; much superb work, with the exception of a very misleading report on Darfur in February 2012

**RD**—Radio Dabanga; an extraordinary network of sources within Darfur

**Reuters**—the best of the wire services in Sudan

**Ryan Boyette**—an American living in the Nuba Mountains who reports regularly on humanitarian conditions and aerial bombing attacks ([www.nubareports.org](http://www.nubareports.org))

**SAS**—Small Arms Survey (Geneva); the best reporting on weapons and weapon flows in South Sudan and the border regions; their longer reports are prepared by internationally recognized experts

**SMC**—Sudan Media Center; a primary regime propaganda organ

**SSP**—Satellite Sentinel Project. Conducts satellite surveillance of conflict areas in Sudan’s border regions

**ST**—*Sudan Tribune* ; now the most important news source for greater Sudan

**Sudan Vision**—online regime propaganda organ

**SUNA**—Sudan News Agency; mouthpiece for the regime with no journalistic independence

***The Independent (UK)***—excellent reporting on the Nuba and South Kordofan

**Tom Catena**—a physician, perhaps the only one in the Nuba Mountains, who provides real-time information, if on a sporadic basis

**UN IRIN**—UN Integrated Regional Information Networks; independent and does a great deal of excellent reporting

**UN News Centre (New York)**—reports only official UN views

**VOA**—Voice of America; relatively independent source

***Washington Post***

## **Military actors, peacekeeping forces, and terms of reference in Sudan**

***Abu Tira***—the Central Reserve Police (CRP); many former *Janjaweed* have been recycled into CRP and other paramilitary forces under Khartoum’s control

**AMIS**—African Union Mission in Sudan (Darfur mission ended December 31, 2007)

**Antonov**—Russian cargo planes retrofitted as “bombers”; crude, imprecise barrel bombs are rolled out the back cargo bay

**BIB**—Border Intelligence Brigade; another paramilitary force in Darfur

***Janjaweed***—Arab militia groups of various degrees of organization and strength; used by Khartoum throughout the counter-insurgency in Darfur

**JEM**—Justice and Equality Movement; led by Djbril Ibrahim, brother of Khalil Ibrahim, former head of JEM

***jihad***—“holy struggle, or war”

**LRA**—the Lord’s Resistance Army, a highly destructive Ugandan militia force; led by Joseph Kony, the LRA for years created an environment of overwhelming fear in northern Uganda. Kony has been forced to move his operations to South Sudan,

northern Democratic Republic of Congo, and Central African Republic; Khartoum has admitted to using the LRA as a military proxy in South Sudan

**MI**—Military Intelligence, the dominant security force in Darfur; increasingly powerful as a political force in Khartoum

***mujahideen***—roughly translated as a military force of “holy warriors”

**NISS**—National Intelligence and Security Service; a vast and ruthless security force, whose primary task is regime preservation, it has many parallel services keeping an eye on one another

**PDF**—Popular Defense Forces; a notoriously brutal paramilitary militia force deployed by Khartoum in Darfur, South Sudan, and the Nuba Mountains

**RMG**—“Rebel”/Renegade Militia Groups; militias in South Sudan funded, armed, and otherwise supplied by Khartoum; they have no political agenda other than looting and civilian terror (see **George Athor** and **Peter Gadet** below)

**SAF**—Sudan Armed Forces; Khartoum’s regular military forces.

**SLA**—Sudan Liberation Army; the SLA has split, reconfigured, and split again; the primary forces are those of **Minni Minawi** and **Abdel Wahid el-Nur**

**SPLA-N**—Sudan People’s Liberation Army-North, comprising elements of the former SPLA who remained in South Kordofan and Blue Nile

**SPLA**—Sudan People’s Liberation Army (now the Army of the Republic of South Sudan)

**SRF**—Sudan Revolutionary Front; a coalescing of the various SLA and JEM rebel groups, the SPLA-N, and the forces of the Beja Congress in eastern Sudan

**UN DPKO**—UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (New York)

**UN Panel of Experts on Darfur**—Created by UN Security Council Resolution 1591, with a mandate to monitor the embargo on arms to Darfur and aerial attacks in the region; the UN has allowed it to collapse as an effective monitoring team

**UNAMID**—UN/African Union Mission in Darfur (mission began January 1, 2008)

**UNMIS**—UN Mission in Sudan (mission began in 2005 and ended in 2011)

**UNMISS**—UN Mission in South Sudan (mission began in 2012); no northern access

## Names of governments, negotiating bodies, and major signed agreements

**Arab League**—at various points has attempted to intervene diplomatically in peace negotiations involving Khartoum and other Sudanese parties; dominated by Egypt, these efforts have consistently supported the NIF/NCP regime

**AUHIP**—African Union High-Level Panel on Implementation; the “implementation” is nominally of the “roadmap for peace in Darfur” produced by chair **Thabo Mbeki** in 2010; this failing, Mbeki moved on to the Abyei file and is now lead AU negotiator in Addis Ababa for talks between Khartoum and Juba

**Cessation of Offensive Hostilities Agreement**—October 15, 2002; the beginning of the end of major military action between Khartoum’s SAF and the South’s SPLA

**CPA**—Comprehensive Peace Agreement (2005) (including the Abyei Protocol)

**DPA**—Darfur Peace Agreement (Abuja, Nigeria; May 2006)

**DDPD**—Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (Doha, Qatar; July 2011); signed by onesmall, factitious rebel group (the “Liberation and Justice Movement”); overwhelmingly rejected by Darfuris

**Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement**—October 2006; terms never implemented

**“Friends of IGAD”**—consortium of European and North American countries supporting IGAD in the Naivasha peace process

**GOS**—Government of Sudan; dominated by the NIF/NCP

**GOSS**—Government of South Sudan

**Heidelberg Darfur Dialogue**—European effort to create a meaningful peace dialogue involving Darfuri civil society; Khartoum refused to allow representatives of the Heidelberg group to attend peace talks in Doha

**IGAD**—Intergovernmental Authority for Development (East African consortium that provided auspices for the Naivasha negotiations)

**Machakos Protocol**—the breakthrough agreement (July 2002) guaranteeing South Sudan the right to a self-determination referendum

**NIF/NCP**—National Islamic Front/National Congress Party (seized power as the NIF in June 1989)

**Peace agreement with the Eastern Front (Fall 2006)**—Yet another failed peace agreement; the Eastern Front had largely collapsed militarily with the signing of the CPA, and had little negotiating leverage with Khartoum

**RSS**—Republic of South Sudan

**SOFA**—Status of Forces Agreement; signed in February 2008 for Darfur

**UN Secretariat**—responsible for variously failed attempts to negotiate peace and protect civilians in greater Sudan

**United States special envoys to Sudan**—reporting to the President, these envoys have often represented remarkable and disturbing policy views

## Names of major political and military figures in Khartoum

**Ahmed Mohamed Haroun Adam**—former State Minister for Interior; first member of the NIF/NCP indicted for atrocity crimes by the ICC; currently governor of South Kordofan

**Al-Sadiq Siddig al-Mahdi**—head of the National Umma Party (NUP), another of the traditional sectarian political parties; Prime Minister of Sudan from 1986 to 1989; head of the Ansar sect

**Ali Ahmed Karti**—long-time NIF/NCP stalwart; now Foreign Minister; headed the PDF during the civil war

**Ali Osman Mohamed Taha**—first vice-president of the regime; negotiated the CPA, which was regarded by many within the regime and the army as a betrayal and sign of weakness; relationship with al-Bashir and the military uncertain

**Field Marshal Omar Hassan Ahmed al-Bashir**—President of the NIF/NCP regime; indicted by the ICC for atrocity crimes in Darfur, including genocide

**General Abdel Rahim Mohamed Hussein**—Defence Minister and former Interior Minister during the most violent years of the Darfur genocide; indicted by the ICC for atrocity crimes in Darfur

**General Awad Ibn Auf**—former head of Military Intelligence; gave the order for the the SAF and *Janjaweed* “to destroy everything” in Darfur

**General Haj Ahmed Algaily Ahmed**—army chief of staff

**General Salah Abdallah “Gosh”**—former powerful head of the intelligence services; the reason for his fall from favor is not fully clear

**Ghazi Salah el-Din Atabani**—long-time NIF/NCP stalwart whose political fortunes have risen and fallen repeatedly

**Gutbi al-Mahdi Mohamed**—seasoned political secretary (politburo chief) of the NIF/NCP

**Hassan Abdullah al-Turabi**—the Popular Congress Party (PCP) is now the politi-

cal vehicle of for al-Turabi, the radical Islamist leader who fell out with the central NIF/NCP leaders in 1999

**Ja'afar Mohamed Nimeiri**—military officer who came to power by military coup in 1969 and remained president until deposed in 1985; civil war began in 1983 with his attempt to impose *sharia* throughout Sudan, and re-divide the South (died May 2009)

**Lt. Gen. Ismat Abdel Rahman al-Zain**—implicated in Darfur atrocity crimes because of his role as SAF director of operations (Khartoum); he is identified in the “confidential Annex” to the report by UN panel of Experts on Darfur (Annex leaked in February 2006); Ismat was one of two generals who in May 2011 confronted al-Bashir, demanding that the military take over decisions about war and peace in Abyei and other border regions

**Major General Adam Hamid Musa**—chair of the Council of States

**Major General Ahmad Khamis**—commander of the 14th Sudan Armed Forces infantry division in Kadugli (scene of atrocity crimes in June–July 2011)

**Major General Bakri Salih**—former Defense Minister; now senior minister for presidential affairs; very influential in current political environment (see above entries for General Sharfi and Ismat)

**Major General Mahjoub Abdallah Sharfi**—head of Military Intelligence, and second of the two generals who in May 2011 confronted al-Bashir, demanding that the military take over decisions about war and peace in Abyei and other border regions

**Mohammed Osman al-Mirghani**—head of the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), one of the two traditional sectarian political parties; head of the Khatmiyya sect

**Mustafa Osman Ismail**—senior presidential advisor to al-Bashir; former Foreign Minister; founding secretary general (1990) of People’s Arab Islamic Conference (characterized by the authoritative *Africa Confidential* as being “later seen as cradle of Al Qaida”)

**Nafi’e Ali Nafi’e**—long-time senior presidential adviser and power broker; until the events of 2011, one of the very most powerful members of the NIF/NCP

## **Names of major political figures in South Sudan (including Abyei), South Kordofan, and Blue Nile**

### *Southern and SPLA/M-North leadership:*

**Abdel Aziz el-Hilu**—Nuba leader of the SPLA-N in South Kordofan; won the May 2011 election for governor of South Kordofan, but Khartoum engineered a victory for **Ahmed Haroun**; Abdel Aziz is widely regarded as an uncommonly skilled military leader and has consistently routed the SAF in the Nuba

**Deng Alor**—South Sudan's first foreign minister and minister of cabinet affairs

**John Garang**—charismatic founder and leader of the Sudan People's Liberation Army/Movement; leader of the Bor Revolt that marked the beginning of the second civil war (1983–2005); led negotiations for the South that produced the CPA; killed in a helicopter crash, July 2005

**Luka Biong**—SPLM member; chief Southern representative of the Abyei Joint Oversight Committee (he is from Abyei); executive director of (not-for-profit) Kush Inc.

**Malik Agaar**—formerly governor of Blue Nile deposed by Khartoum following the military assault of September 1, 2011; a powerful leader within the SPLA/M, he is now equally powerful as leader of the SPLA/M-North

**Nhial Deng**—long-time fighter with the SPLA; now Sudan's foreign minister

**Pagan Amum**—long-time SPLA/M leader; as of July 2012 leading negotiations with Khartoum over unresolved issues

**Salva Kiir**—a long-time deputy to John Garang, Kiir became president of the Government of South Sudan following Garang's death

**Yasir Arman**—Secretary General of the SPLM-North and Secretary of External Affairs for the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF)

**Yusef Kuwa**—led the people of the Nuba through the campaign of extinction waged by Khartoum in the 1990s; one of the great men to emerge in the civil war

*UN, AU, and international leadership in Sudan:*

(Only European and American hemisphere names are ordered with last name first; there are too many variations in name order and transliteration for many African, African, and Asian names, and these are ordered by first letter of first name to be included)

**Guéhenno, Jean-Marie**—former head of UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, including during the time of UNAMID authorization and deployment

**Haile Menkerios**—an Eritrean diplomat and the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Sudan

**Johnson, Hilde**—Norwegian diplomat, instrumental in negotiating the CPA; she nowheads the UN mission in South Sudan

**Ladsous, Hevré**—new head of UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations; convinced that security on the ground in Darfur has improved sufficiently to permit a draw-down of UNAMID police and military personnel

**Moreno-Ocampo, Luis**—Prosecutor for the ICC

**Navi Pillay**—UN High Commissioner for Human Rights; bears much responsibility for the slow response to the atrocity crimes in South Kordofan reported in great detail by a UN human rights team on the ground in June 2011

**Thabo Mbeki**—chief African Union diplomat on the Sudan portfolio; failed to resolve the Abyei crisis and is distrusted by South Sudan

**Valerie Amos**—head of UN OCHA and UN Emergency Humanitarian Coordinator

*U.S. political and diplomatic leaders on Sudan:*

**Clinton, Hillary**—U.S. Secretary of State in the Obama administration

**Gration, Scott**—appointed by President Barack Obama as U.S. special envoy for Sudan in March 2009; from the very beginning, Gration revealed ignorance of Sudan’s history, and was distrusted by humanitarian organizations, Darfuris, diplomats, South Sudanese, the people of Abyei, and human rights activists. Gration was recently fired from his new position as U.S. ambassador to Kenya

**Kerry, Senator John**—*ad hoc* Obama administration envoy to Sudan in 2009 and 2010; declared in April 2009 that humanitarian capacity lost with the March expulsions could be replaced in a matter of weeks following “an agreement with Khartoum”; promoted “compromise” on Abyei (fall 2010)

**Lyman, Princeton**—Scott Gration’s successor as special envoy; he is committed to the notion that the Khartoum regime can oversee democratic transformation in Sudan

**Rice, Susan**—U.S. ambassador to the UN; she is a former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs; in policy debates with Gration, she was consistently overruled by the intelligence community, which sees in Khartoum an indispensable ally in the “war on terror”

**Smith, Dane**—U.S. diplomat assigned to Darfur; Smith has experience but no mandate or political power, and has been given the impossible task of helping oversee implementation of the “Doha Document for Peace in Darfur”

*Other actors of consequence:*

**George Athor**—now dead; while alive, Athor (a former senior officer in the SPLA) was leader of one of the most dangerous and destructive of the so-called “Rebel/Renegade Militia Groups” (RMG), supplied and armed by Khartoum

**David Yau Yau**—one of the most ruthless of the RMG, operating primarily in Jonglei

**Girifna**—Arabic for “we’ve had enough”; an opposition group working non-violently for regime change in Sudan; the group formed in 2011, but the uprising began in Khartoum in earnest in late June 2012

**Idriss Déby**—President of Chad; he engaged in a proxy war with Khartoum during the early years of the Darfur genocide, making the border areas between the two countries extremely dangerous; he supported the JEM in particular because of its Zaghawa dominance

**Isaias Afwerki**—President of Eritrea, Isaias is trying to establish a closer relationship with Khartoum; during the civil war he supported the military rebellion in eastern Sudan (dominated by the SPLA); war with Ethiopia remains a clear possibility

**Johnson Olonyi**—leader of primarily Shilluk RMG in Upper Nile

**Meles Zenawi**—President of Ethiopia and neighbor to Sudan and South Sudan; in a “wiki-leaked” cable dated January 30, 2009, Zenawi tells the U.S. that toppling the Khartoum regime is the best option for dealing with Sudan’s crises; Meles died in August 2012

**Peter Gadet**—another RMG leader and feared military commander; he has de-

fecting back to the SPLA (though he has defected and re-defected perhaps a dozen times)

**Yoweri Kaguta Museveni**—president of Uganda

*Names of major political figures and military actors in Darfur:*

**Abdel Wahid el-Nur**—a Fur and leader of what remains of the original Sudan Liberation Movement/Army; his military strength lies primarily in Jebel Marra, but he has long been a favorite of Darfuris in the IDP camps, although this favor has waned in recent years; the Fur are the largest tribal group in Darfur

**Ali Kushayb**—the *nom du guerre* for one of the most notorious *Janjaweed* leaders; known as the “colonel of colonels,” Kushayb is responsible for some of the worst mass atrocities in West Darfur, especially in the Wadi Saleh region; he was one of the first to be indicted by the ICC for atrocity crimes

**Ban Ki-moon**—Ban came into the role of UN Secretary-General promising to make Darfur a “signature issue”; instead, he quickly found himself overwhelmed by Khartoum’s intransigence, and has failed to secure either peace or justice in Darfur or greater Sudan in his first full term of office

**Charpentier, George**—previously the UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Sudan; in this role he declared that Khartoum was not interfering with humanitarian access; his assessment has been widely and substantially contradicted by nongovernmental humanitarian organizations, as well as by UN humanitarian officials

**Cycmanick, Christopher**—spokesman for UNAMID. In an interview with Radio Dabanga (May 20, 2012), he “described the security situation in Darfur as ‘relatively calm’”

**Djbril Ibrahim**—Khalil’s brother, now head of the Justice and Equality Movement

**El-Tigani Ateem Seisi**—a Fur and former governor of Darfur, Seisi was the only Darfuri signatory to the “Doha Document for Peace in Darfur” (July 2011); he signed on behalf of a small, militarily and politically powerless group known as the Liberation and Justice Movement (LJM); the peace agreement has been overwhelmingly rejected by Darfuri civil society, camp leaders, and rebel groups of consequence

**Ibrahim Gambari**—leader of UNAMID in Darfur; he has failed to confront Khartoum over its many refusals of access to UNAMID investigators and refuses to speak honestly about either security conditions or the humanitarian situation

**Khalil Ibrahim**—former head of the Justice and Equality Movement, Khalil refused to sign the May 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement; his past connections with Hassan al-Turabi and the Islamists in Khartoum make many Darfuris uneasy about his true agenda; Khalil fought with the PDF during the civil war

**Kofi Annan**—in speaking about Darfur in April 2004, former UN Secretary General Annan invoked Rwanda and the failure of the international community (Annan was head of UN peacekeeping before and during the genocide); he appeared to promise humanitarian intervention but was soon checked by the UN political leadership

**Martin Luther Agwai**—first UNAMID force commander; he left his position at the same time as Rodolphe Adada, echoing his words about the “end of major violence Darfur”

**Minni Minawi**—a Zaghawa and leader of the Sudan Liberation Army/Movement-Minni Minawi (SLA/M-MM); Minawi was the sole signatory of the 2005 Darfur Peace Agreement in Abuja, and signed only under duress; he left the regime he had become part of in later 2010, setting in motion violent military conflict and Zaghawa civilian destruction that continues to the present

**Musa Hilal**—the most infamous of the various *Janjaweed* leaders, Hilal is perhaps best known for his direction of the Tawila slaughter of late February 2004, and his directive to “change the demography of Darfur” and “empty it of African tribes”

**Rodolphe Adada**—Gambari’s predecessor, notable mainly for declaring on his departure in 2009 that major violence had ended in Darfur